“A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments

Requate, Till; Waichman, Israel

doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9256-2

Cited by 31 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…The comparison of decomposed games and matrix games adds to the literature on presentation effects (Charness et al, 2004;Requate and Waichman, 2010;Gürerk and Selten, 2011). The comparison of role assignment procedures also complements the studies by Murphy et al (2011) and Kerschbamer (2015a), which discuss how to identify distributional preferences based on sub-jects' choices in several resource allocation tasks but do not discuss the issue of role assignment.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influences of Social Context on the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

2016

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Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that, at the aggregate level, role uncertainty and decomposed games lead to higher degrees of prosociality when compared to role certainty. At the individual level, we observe considerable differences in behavior across the social contexts, indicating that the majority of people are sensitive to these different social settings but respond in different ways.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influences of Social Context on the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

2016

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“…Requate and Waichman [27] find that there is substantially more collusion (corresponding to λ = 1 in Equation (23)) in PT and PC treatments as compared to BRO. They find, in a static duopoly experiment, that the collusive outcome is reached at least once in the 20 rounds, in 62%, 78% and 29% of the markets, respectively, in the PT, PC and BRO treatments.…”

Section: Empirical Evidence From Oligopoly Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Maximizing Equation (27) with respect to q i gives the optimal (pure) strategy for firm i (Definition 11), given his social projection Function (23):…”

Section: Evidential Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For public goods games, see Dawes and Thaler [18], Fehr and Gächter [19] and Gächter and Thöni [20]. For voting games, see Quattrone and Tversky [21], Grafstein [22], Forsythe et al [23], Rassenti et al [24], Krueger and Acevedo [25], Koudenburg [26], Requate and Waichman [27] and Delavande and Manski [28]. For p-beauty contests, see Moulin [29], Nagel [30] and de Sousa et al [31].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information

al‐Nowaihi

Dhami

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners' dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic significance to their own actions in forming beliefs about the actions of other like-minded players. This is best viewed as a heuristic or bias relative to the standard approach. We provide a formal theoretical framework that incorporates ER into static games by proposing evidential games and the relevant solution concept: evidential equilibrium (EE). We derive the relation between a Nash equilibrium and an EE. We illustrate these concepts in the context of the prisoners' dilemma game.

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“…26 Requate and Waichman (2011), and Gürerk and Selten (2012) explore the effects of the provision of payoff tables in experimental oligopolies. They find that provision has a considerable effect on initial behavior and it makes collusion more likely to occur.…”

Section: Parts Within Each Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment

Jansen

Pollak

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in July 2015Abstract We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor's product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the firms' behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, in our experiment, subjects' product-market conduct is largely consistent with theoretical predictions.

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“A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments

Abstract: Cournot oligopoly, Laboratory experiment, Profit table, Profit calculator, Best-response calculator, L13, C72, C92, D21,

Cited by 31 publications

References 36 publications

The Influences of Social Context on the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

The Influences of Social Context on the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information

Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment

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