A Private Ordering Defense of a Company's Right to Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs

Las acciones como derechos de voto adicionales por lealtad «acciones de lealtad» desde el análisis económico del derecho

“…36 La literatura discute si el diseño óptimo debe basarse en el tiempo o en que ocurran determinados supuestos, oponiendo las llamadas time-based provisions a las llamadas event-based provisions (Fisch y Davidoff Solomon, 2019). También, se rechazan duraciones arbitrarias, argumentando que la duración debería depender de las características de la empresa o de sus fundadores (Moore, 2019) y se presentan argumentos a favor de la libertad contractual y en contra de que las cláusulas de puesta de sol sean imperativas (Sharfman, 2018). obstante, la situación es bien distinta en relación con las acciones de lealtad habituales en las jurisdicciones europeas, que, salvo el caso de España, no prevén mecanismos de reversión y, por tanto, garantizan la perpetuidad de estos mecanismos de abaratamiento y blindaje del control.…”

Up the Hill and Down Again: Constraining Dual-Class Shares

“…38 Ostracism from the indices is a key reason why the standard tier is considered unattractive, 39 since it excludes issuers from investment by passive investors with investment strategies that simply track specific indices, 40 and the corresponding increase in liquidity and share price. 41 Of further importance, given the UK Government's aspirations to "empower" retail investors and increase the opportunities for investors to share in the growth of companies, 42 is that many pension plans and other investment products pursue passive investment strategies, meaning that the capacity for the general public to participate in a diversified manner in the performance of dual-class companies is curtailed if they are restricted to the standard tier and omitted from the indices. 43 As an example, perversely, passive investors tracking the FTSE-100 are currently not able to invest, or share, in the burgeoning post-IPO share price of The Hut Group, even though it would otherwise sit comfortably within the FTSE-100 based upon market capitalisation.…”

Governance Complexities in Firms with Dual Class Shares

“…8 Some commentators argue that DCS should be permitted because otherwise, DCS firms would be left to the whims of incompetent or uninformed shareholders. 9 Others argue that the weaker governance associated with DCS is built into the firm's stock price and ultimately caveat emptor should rule the day. That is, all investors have the choice as to whether to invest and "if you don't like them, don't buy them."…”