A Privacy Preserving Application Acquisition Protocol

Abstract

In the smart card industry, the application acquisition process involves the card issuers and application providers. During this process, the respective card issuer reveals the identity of the smart card user to the individual application providers. In certain application scenarios it might be necessary (e.g. banking and identity applications). However, with introduction of the Trusted Service Manager (TSM) architecture there might be valid cases where revealing the card user's identity is not necessary. At the moment, the secure channel protocols for traditional smart card architecture including the TSM does not preserve the privacy of the card users. In this paper, we propose a secure and trusted channel protocol that provide such feature along with satisfying the requirements of an open and dynamic environment referred as User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM). A comparison is provided between the proposed protocol and selected smart card protocols. In addition, we provide an informal analysis along with mechanical formal analysis using CasperFDR. Finally, we provide the test implementation and performance results.

Coopetitive Architecture to Support a Dynamic and Scalable NFC Based Mobile Services Architecture

“…It will endorse that the platform conforms to the stated security and operational requirements [14], along with the attestation process and its e ectiveness. The SCM may deliver the Chain1 Chain 2…”

“…The reliability assurance process veri es that the software part of the smart card platform is not been tampered/modi ed. For the description of the TEM and implementation of the attestation handler see [14].…”

“…An ACAP for the CASC should meet sixteen goals stated in [14] along with the additional goals listed as below: G17) Platform & Application User Separation (PAU) Attack: A malicious user provides access credentials of a genuine user to an SP and downloads the application on her smart card [14]. A protocol should tie a platform with its respective card-owner (user) to avoid platform & application user separation attack.…”

Sustainable and Practical Firmware Upgrade for Wireless Access Point Using Password-Based Authentication

“…Unknown key-share resilience-Unknown key share attack may occur when the connection between a firmware server and a WAP is established, but the WAP or the server believes it is sharing the key related to connection with another entity [36,37]. Proposed protocol's message always have a MAC (Message Authentication Code).…”

Secure Profile Provisioning Architecture for Embedded UICC

“…Thus, any detail and published secure profile provisioning directly related to eUICC cannot be found, but only few works which describes the enhanced business process for a flexible MCIM (M2M Communication Identity Module) [7] and several works related to the provisioning for UICCs or smart cards can be found [6], [8]- [13]. In [7], the business process related to M2M is mainly focused, therefore no detail consideration of security can be found.…”