A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence

Preemptive bribery and incomplete information: Does prior knowledge matter?

“…These results are, therefore, related to the existing literature as to whether a principal can deter collusion (in other contexts) by introducing asymmetric information. Kofman and Lawarrée () study a principal who hires two supervisors to inspect the same firm sequentially. They show that if each supervisor does not know for certain whether she is the first or the second to inspect the firm, collusion can be deterred .…”

Activism, separation of powers and development

“…The role of external auditors (activist S1) in preventing collusion between the firm and the internal auditor (S2) has been examined in the collusion context by Kofman and Lawaree (1993). See Kofman and Lawaree (1996) and Mishra (2002) also.…”

Delineating the Proper Scope of Government - A Proper Task for a Constitutional Court?

“…A rational agent or supervisor will calculate in the same way. If all actors are fully rational, the difference between the two options thus boils down to meeting the participation constraints of the agent and the supervisor (for a more extensive treatment of the model see TIROLE [1986]; KOFMAN and LAWARRÉE [1996]; LAFFONT [1999]). …”

“…At most it produces information about the ability and the type of politicians or political parties, not about political actions specifically (KOFMAN and LAWARRÉE [1996] 120). These qualities are no more than one element to be considered on election day, the ideological orientation being at least as important as reliability and professionalism.…”