A Primer on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy

Abstract

This primer presents a succinct summary of the evolution of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy from the initial development of nuclear weapons until the present day. This is not a definitive history but an introduction to deterrence policy for those with limited background in this area. The concept of deterrence is discussed in several ways -in a general description of deterrence theory, in an historical review of nuclear policy evolution, in a discussion of the future of deterrence, in historical examples of deterrence successes and failures, and in a review of significant contributors to the study of nuclear policy. The intent is to present an authoritative, unclassified account. To accomplish this, to the extent possible, primary source documents were located and utilized if they were available and declassified. These included unclassified Presidential nuclear policy guidance from the Presidential libraries, official JCS histories and State Department Foreign Relations histories. The writings of noted nuclear strategists and historians were also valuable resources for this primer on U.S. strategic nuclear policy. 4

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“…As the state's territory can be easily targeted and "held at risk", it becomes possible to deter and control a nation. However, it is difficult to locate VNSAs or determine their strategic valuable assets due to their transnational nature (Kusman and Lawson, 2001).…”

Shifting Away From Cold War Nuclear Thinking? Nuclear Strategy under the Obama Administration

“…In the absence of any further interest from the administration or any specific policy guidance on the employment of nuclear weapons, the first war plans did not even envision the use of atomic bombs. (Kunsman;Lawson [2001]: p. 22.)…”

“…Although his escalation concept was not directly transferred into policy guidance (it was too complex) but his seminal works laid down a solid basis for the doctrine of flexible response and the counterforce strategy of the early 1960s. (Kunsman;Lawson [2001]: p. 47.)…”

“…Besides, a completely new objective was also included: the retardation of Soviet advances in Western Europe. (Kunsman;Lawson [2001] Altogether, Truman tried to keep the U.S. nuclear arsenal under strict civilian control and limit the use of these weapons but despite his initial skepticism, the rapid 11 Parallel to these developments, SAC gained a bigger control over the target lists. After a high level Air Staff target panel in January, 1951 the participants agreed that SAC concerns about isolated targets were valid hence target lists would "concentrate on industry itself which is located in urban areas" so that even if a bomb missed its target, "a bonus will be derived from the use of the bomb" by causing major destructions in the civilian population.…”

“…However, it also remarked that these new developments will very soon provide both sides with the capability to destroy the other and the U.S. might lose its nuclear superiority. (Kunsman;Lawson [2001]: pp. 36-37.…”