A post quantum secure construction of an authentication protocol for satellite communication

Abstract

Satellite's communication system is used to communicate under significant distance and circumstances where the other communication systems are not comfortable.Since all the data are exchanged over a public channel, so the security of the data is an essential component for the communicating parties. Both key exchange and authentication are two cryptographic tools to establish a secure communication between two parties. Currently, various kinds of authentication protocols are available to establish a secure network, but all of them depend on number-theoretical (discrete logarithm problem/factorization assumption) hard assumptions. Due to Shor's and Grover's computing algorithm number theoretic assumptions are breakable by quantum computers. Although Kumar and Garg have proposed a quantum attack-resistant protocol for satellite communication, it cannot resist stolen smart card attack. We have analyzed that how Kumar and Garg is vulnerable to the stolen smart card attack using differential power analysis attack described in He et al and Chen and Chen. We have also analyzed the modified version of signal leakage attack and sometimes called improved signal leakage attack on Kumar and Garg's protocol.We have tried to construct a secure and efficient authentication protocol for satellites communication that is secure against quantum computing. This is more efficient as it requires only three messages of exchange. This paper includes security proof and performance of the proposed authentication and key agreement protocol.

Efficient and quantum‐secure authenticated key exchange scheme for mobile satellite communication networks

“…Schemes by Dharminder et al 18 and Kumar and Garg 6 have almost similar computation efficiency as the proposed scheme, according to Table 7.…”

“…However, we have analyzed that scheme by Dharminder et al 18 is susceptible to denial of service attack. As in their scheme, aid i = id i ⨁Hðk u i jjη ui jja u i Þ sent to server and then server retrieve identity (id i ) of user using aid i , which is further used to calculate v u i to authenticate the user.…”

“…As a result, the server may be involved in unauthorized communication responses, leading to a denial of service scenario for a valid user. In 2023, Dharminder et al 18 presented a stolen smart card attack on Kumar and Garg 6 using a differential power analysis strategy published in He et al 19 Moreover, Dharminder et al 18 presented a new KEA protocol for satellite communication to enhance security in a postquantum era. This is more efficient as it needs only four messages to be exchanged.…”

“…Therefore, the total communication of our proposed scheme is 4673+4641 = 9314 bits.Next, in Kumar and Garg,6 the user starts the communication sent by the login request < A ui > to the satellite and then the satellite adds ID sat to the received message and transmits < A ui , ID sat > , where the sizes of A ui , ID sat are 4096 and 32 bit each, and the NCC sends the respond request < a ni , w ni ,b ni > to satellite, and satellite passes the message < a ni , w ni , b ni , ID sat > with its own identity to user, where the sizes of < a ni , w ni , b ni ,ID sat > are 4096, 1, 512, and 32 bits, respectively, and the end the user sends the last communication message < w ui , b ui , AID i , IDsat > to NCC, where the sizes of < w ui , b ui , AID i , IDsat > are 1, 512, 512, and 32 bits, respectively. Therefore, the total communication cost of Kumar and Garg 6 scheme is 9826 bits.Next, in Dharminder et al18 protocol, the mobile user sends login request < a ui , v ui , w ui , aid i > to the satellite via public channel, then the satellite adds id sat to the received message and transmits < a u i , v u i , w u i ,aid i > ,id sat > to NCC, where the sizes of a u i ,v u i , w u i ,aid i , id sat are 4096, 512, 1, 512, and 32 bits, respectively, and the NCC sends the respond request < b ni , w ni , a ni , id sat > to satellite, and satellite passes the message < b ni , w ni , a ni > to user U i , where the sizes of b ni ,w ni , a ni , id sat are 512, 1, 4096, and 32 bits, respectively. Therefore, the total communication of Dharminder et al scheme is 5153+4641 = 9794 bits.…”

A Survey on Authentication in Satellite Internet

“…In recent years, the rapid development of quantum computers has rendered it possible to effortlessly crack traditional cryptographic schemes based on number theory, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem (RSA) algorithm and elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) algorithm. Therefore, Kumar et al [34] and Dharminder et al [35] proposed AKA schemes based on ring learning with error, respectively, which are secure against quantum attacks.…”