A Plurality of Pluralisms: Collaborative Practice in Archaeology

Wylie, Alison

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-14349-1_10

Cited by 88 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…However, other archaeologists could disagree because they believe that ethnocentric bias embedded in the background assumptions of the methods can make researchers blind to the existence of some important evidence or interpretive resources. So before this threat is averted, one should not rely on the results of the project, nor an overall picture of the research subject drawn from them (see Wylie [2015]). In such a case the disagreement stems from different assessments of what are the important risks in the context of that archaeological project.…”

Section: The Risk Account Of Scientific Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity

Koskinen¹

2020

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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When discussing scientific objectivity, many philosophers of science have recently focused on accounts that can be applied in practice when assessing the objectivity of something. It has become clear that in different contexts, objectivity is realized in different ways, and the many senses of objectivity recognized in the recent literature seem to be conceptually distinct. I argue that these diverse 'applicable' senses of scientific objectivity have more in common than has thus far been recognized. I combine arguments from philosophical discussions of trust, from negative accounts of objectivity, and from the recent literature on epistemic risks. When we call X objective, we endorse it: we say that we rely on X, and that others should do so too. But the word 'objective' is reserved for a specific type of reliance: it is based on the belief that important epistemic risks arising from our imperfections as epistemic agents have been effectively averted. All the positive senses of objectivity identify either some risk of this type, or some efficient strategy for averting one or more such risks.

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Section: The Risk Account Of Scientific Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity

Koskinen¹

2020

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Among these, of relevance here are insulation: the items exist in separation from each other, they co-exist without consequential contact; interaction: the items interact, perhaps cross-fertilize or cross-check one another; and integration: the items are being integrated into relatively coherent systems (cf. Chang 2012:269, Van Bouwel 2015, Wylie 2015. And finally, another relevant dimension ranges from intra-academic (including intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary items) to extraacademic (encompassing a diverse variety of items, from business interests to indigenous knowledge systems, and so on).…”

Section: Transdisciplinary and Pluralist Views On Extra-academic Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The latter idea is implied by the view that several pluralists hold, namely that allowing for a variety of critical viewpoints and approaches is beneficial in science (e.g. Longino 1990, 2002a, Kitcher 1993, Wylie 2015. Among them, Wylie has explicitly extended this beyond intra-academic positions, arguing that extra-academic approaches to a given issue may also be epistemically useful.…”

Section: Transdisciplinary and Pluralist Views On Extra-academic Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another related endorsement of extra-academic collaboration and participation stems from feminist philosophy of science and feminist social epistemology. Drawing on this source, Alison Wylie (2015) has recently offered a pluralist argument according to which extra-academic communities may be able to offer epistemically important criticism from their unique standpoint.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extra-academic transdisciplinarity and scientific pluralism: what might they learn from one another?

Koskinen

Mäki

2016

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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The paper looks at challenges related to the ideas of integration and knowledge systems in extra-academic transdisciplinarity (TD). Philosophers of science are only starting paying attention to the increasingly common practice of introducing extra-academic perspectives or engaging extra-academic parties in academic knowledge production. So far the rather scant philosophical discussion on the subject has mainly concentrated on the question whether such engagement is beneficial in science or not. Meanwhile, there is quite a large and growing literature on extra-academic TD, mostly authored by non-philosophers, seeking to develop TD research practices. We examine this literature in the light of recent discussions in pluralist philosophies of science. Some philosophical pluralists see the increase of extra-academic collaboration and participation in science as a potentially positive development. However, certain views promoted in the non-philosophical literature on extra-academic TD appear problematic in the light of the pluralistic discussions. For instance, the literature on TD appears to be overly optimistic with regard to integration, and the notion of knowledge systems used in it is problematic. We believe it would be worthwhile for scientific pluralists sympathetic to the aims of TD to look more closely into the complex settings in which extra-academic collaboration and participation happens in actual TD projects, and to offer constructive criticisms, exploiting insights developed within pluralist philosophy of science.

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“…The emphasis on applicability has led to discussions about objectivity in different contexts. What makes research objective in fields that use statistical techniques differs from what makes archaeological collaborations with descendant communities objective, or what makes the science of well-being objective (Freese and Peterson 2018;Wylie 2015;Alexandrova 2018). It seems that an applicable account of scientific objectivity has to be somehow contextual.…”

Section: Applicable Senses Of Scientific Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Objectivity in contexts: withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias

Koskinen

2020

Synthese

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In this paper I discuss and develop the risk account of scientific objectivity, which I have recently introduced, contrasting it to some alternatives. I then use the account in order to analyse a practice that is relatively common in anthropology, in the history of science, and in the sociology of scientific knowledge: withholding epistemic judgement. I argue that withholding epistemic judgement on the beliefs one is studying can be a relatively efficient strategy against collective bias in these fields. However, taking into account the criticisms presented against the strategy, I also argue that it is a usable strategy only when the distance between the researchers and their ideas, and the people and ideas being studied, is significant enough. two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are my own.

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A Plurality of Pluralisms: Collaborative Practice in Archaeology

Cited by 88 publications

References 21 publications

Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity

Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity

Extra-academic transdisciplinarity and scientific pluralism: what might they learn from one another?

Objectivity in contexts: withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias

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