A pluralistic theory of wordhood

Abstract

What are words and how should we individuate them? There are two main answers on the philosophical market. For some, words are bundles of structural–functional features defining a unique performance profile. For others, words are noneternal continuants individuated by their causal‐historical ancestry. These conceptions offer competing views of the nature of words, and it seems natural to assume that at most one of them can capture the essence of wordhood. This paper makes a case for pluralism about wordhood: The view that there is a plurality of acceptable conceptions of the nature of words, none of which is uniquely entitled to inform us as to what wordhood consists in.

Using a two-dimensional model from social ontology to explain the puzzling metaphysical features of words

“…The data get more complex when we consider a word's relation to its meaning. Gasparri (2020) gives a few examples that illustrate further puzzles:…”

“…Can they be associated to a single polysemous word, or should they be understood as senses of numerically distinct words? (Gasparri 2020) In some cases, it looks like the same word like 'skyline' can change meaning, and in other cases it looks like different meanings of 'fluke' make the same-looking word a different word. In the next section I look at whether the type-token model is equipped to handle data like these, concluding that the model falls short of offering a satisfying explanation for the data above.…”

Languages and language use

“…Though the details of his account are widely disputed, it is often thought that something in this vicinity must be right.For discussion, seeBurge (1975), Skyrms (1996,Marmor (1996),Jackman (1998),Marmor (2009),Millikan (1998),Gilbert (1989), and Gilbert (2008).16 For Lewis, this is truthfulness and trust in L. SeeLewis (1969),Lewis (1975).17 See, e.g.,Capellen (1999),Gasparri (2016),Gasparri (2020),Irmak (2019),Leckie and Williams (2019),Miller (2019),Mallory (2020), and Neft (2019).…”