A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty

Abstract

List of Tables vi Acknowledgments vii Introduction: Philosophy and Child Poverty 1 Social Justice for Children-A Capability Approach 1.1 The currency of justice 1.2 Selecting functionings and capabilities for children 1.3 Sufficiency and equality 1.4 Conclusions 2 The Injustice of Child Poverty 2.1 Concepts and measures of child poverty 2.2 The Ill-Being and Ill-Becoming of child poverty: physical and mental health 2.3 The Ill-Being and Ill-Becoming of child poverty: social inclusion and education 2.4 The subjective experience of child poverty 2.5 Conclusions 3 Responsibilities for Children in Poverty 3.1 Attributing responsibilities to agents of justice 3.2 Important agents of justice and their responsibilities 3.3 The family and the state 3.4 Conclusions 4 Advancing Our Approach to Global Justice for Children 4.1 Conclusions

The Social Injustice of Parental Imprisonment

“…In section 3.2 we showed that the principle of equal concern becomes the sole guiding principle for luck egalitarianism in cases regarding inequalities among 8 In this regard, our account of justice for children has important similarities to the view defended by Schweiger and Graf (2015), although their view is grounded in the capability approach of Nussbaum and Sen rather than a pluralist distribuendum of resources and welfare. Also, on a similar basis to my account, Brighouse and Swift (2014) provide a compelling argument to justify the right of children to have parents.…”

“…In addition to psychological harm, families of prisoners often suffer from the loss of household income as well as other financial costs and burdens associated with prison visits (Arditti 2012;Arditti, Lambert-Shute, and Joest 2003;Murray 2005). This might lead to or increase child poverty, which is a serious ethical concern in its own right (Schweiger 2019;Schweiger and Graf 2015). Here we should note that it is likely that the psychological wellbeing of children of prisoners might further deteriorate in such economically constrained circumstances as well as by a lack of social and emotional support.…”

“…Some might argue that this account of agency and responsibility is ageist, especially towards somewhat older children. Let us therefore give yet another reason not to hold children responsible; namely, that they, due to being in a very important and potentially fragile developmental phase, are vulnerable (Schweiger and Graf 2015;Schweiger 2019). Demanding full responsibility from them during this phase might hinder the process of their becoming autonomous adults.…”

“…Hence, a fair distribution of both economic and social resources, such as having access to equal education and a caring and supporting environment, is indeed important for children. However, from a justice perspective, we should not only think about the type of goods that are beneficial for children later in life, but also about goods that are important for children here and now (MacLeod 2010;Schweiger and Graf 2015). In addition to a metric that makes sense of inequalities among adults, we also need a metric that can handle inequalities among children qua children.…”

Towards a capability approach to child growth: A theoretical framework

“…In a similar vein, we suggest that the definition of child growth should not be restricted to physical growth but should rather be expanded to incorporate parental, societal, and other dimensions. The capability approach has been widely applied in studies of child poverty (Biggeri & Mehrotra, 2011;Schweiger & Graf, 2015;Yousefzadeh Daal Faghati & Gossmann, 2016), well-being (Biggeri, Ballet, & Comim, 2011;Fegter & Richter, 2014), and education (Biggeri & Santi, 2012). In child growth, however, the capability approach has not been applied, and this paper aims to explore how a capability approach to child growth could be developed.…”