A Philosophical Evaluation of Adaptationism as a Heuristic Strategy

Abstract

Adaptationism has for decades been the topic of sophisticated debates in philosophy of biology but methodological adaptationism has not received as much attention as the empirical and explanatory issues. In addition, adaptationism has mainly been discussed in the context of evolutionary biology and not in fields such as zoophysiology and systems biology where this heuristic is also used in design analyses of physiological traits and molecular structures. This paper draws on case studies from these fields to discuss the productive and problematic aspects of this heuristic in different research practices, in functional as well as evolutionary studies on different levels of biological organization. Gould and Lewontin's Spandrels-paper famously criticized adaptationist methodology for implying the risk of generating 'blind spots' with respect to non-selective effects on evolution. Some have claimed that this bias can be accommodated through the testing of evolutionary hypotheses. Although this is an important aspect of overcoming naïve adaptationism, I argue that the issue of methodological biases is broader than the question of testability. I demonstrate the productivity of adaptationist heuristics but also discuss the deeper problematic aspects associated with the methodological imperialism that is part of the strong adaptationist position.

Revisiting generality in biology: systems biology and the quest for design principles

“…Yet, there are major disagreements about the specific content and implications of the theory, e.g. the extent to which natural selection determines the direction of evolution, the dynamics and unit of natural selection, and the heuristic and explanatory value of adaptationism (Amundson 1994;Green 2014). This paper challenges the view that there could be no role for laws and general principles in biology.…”

Introduction to Philosophy of Systems Biology

“…Accounts of whether and how a trait was selected often seem unnecessary for the functional analysis (Boogerd, Chapter 4). Systems biology thus opens for the possibility that design thinking, and design explanation, can be dissociated from evolutionary assumptions at least in some contexts (Green 2014;Green, Levy and Bechtel 2015;Wouters 2007). …”

“…Accounts of whether and how a trait was selected often seem unnecessary for the functional analysis (Boogerd, Chapter 4). Systems biology thus opens for the possibility that design thinking, and design explanation, can be dissociated from evolutionary assumptions at least in some contexts (Green 2014;Green, Levy and Bechtel 2015;Wouters 2007).In recent years, the new branch of evolutionary systems biology has emerged (Jaeger, Chapter 13; Soyer 2012, ed.). An important aim of evolutionary systems biology is to supplement evolutionary studies with a quantitative analysis that is also forward-looking in focusing on how the regulatory structure of biological networks influences the potential for evolutionary change.…”

Can biological complexity be reverse engineered?

“…Most of the criticism has centered on the problematic inferences from the beneficial functions of network motifs to the selective origin of these (reviewed in Green, 2014). But critics have also pointed to problematic idealizations involved in the modeling of activation profiles for the motifs.…”

“…I first draw on two examples to illustrate the problem of 'synchronic underdetermination' for reverse engineering of 5 In the context of evolution biology, design thinking has been criticized for having adaptationist implications. I have discussed the relation between design approaches and adaptationism elsewhere (Green 2014;Green, Levy and Bechtel, 2015), and this paper instead concerns the challenges for reverse engineering associated with synchronic and diachronic degeneracy. I shall, however, discuss the possible role of reverse engineering in evolutionary studies in Section 5.…”