2016
DOI: 10.1002/net.21720
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A penalized best‐response algorithm for nonlinear single‐path routing problems

Abstract: This article is devoted to nonlinear single‐path routing problems, which are known to be NP‐hard even in the simplest cases. For solving these problems, we propose an algorithm inspired from Game Theory in which individual flows are allowed to independently select their path to minimize their own cost function. We design the cost function of the flows so that the resulting Nash equilibrium of the game provides an efficient approximation of the optimal solution. We establish the convergence of the algorithm and… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…The problem differs however significantly from traditional single-path routing problems as on one hand the same resource appears at different layers of the expanded network and on the other hand the volume of a traffic demand may change from one layer to the other. Nevertheless the heuristic algorithm that we propose in this section is directly inspired from an algorithm proposed in [15] for solving such problems. The idea of the algorithm is to view the traffic demands as the players of a non-cooperative game in which each each player independently optimizes its own objective function.…”
Section: Penalized Best-response Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The problem differs however significantly from traditional single-path routing problems as on one hand the same resource appears at different layers of the expanded network and on the other hand the volume of a traffic demand may change from one layer to the other. Nevertheless the heuristic algorithm that we propose in this section is directly inspired from an algorithm proposed in [15] for solving such problems. The idea of the algorithm is to view the traffic demands as the players of a non-cooperative game in which each each player independently optimizes its own objective function.…”
Section: Penalized Best-response Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The pseudocode of our heuristic is given in Algorithm 1. Note that it is fully similar to the algorithm in [15], the only difference being in the way the traffic flowing on a resource is computed. The algorithm starts from an initial feasible solution π (0) .…”
Section: Penalized Best-response Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Amiri et al [3,4], Rolland et al [29], and recently Fortz et al [12] present Lagrangian-relaxation-based heuristics for ODIMCF. And Brun et al [9] develop an approximation heuristic inspired by game theory's Nash equilibrium.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Brun et al consider nonlinear single path routing problems, which are known to be NP‐hard even in the simplest cases. The authors propose an algorithm inspired from Game Theory in which individual flows are allowed to independently select their path to minimize their own cost function.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%