2012
DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2010.2093547
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A Novel Technique for Improving Hardware Trojan Detection and Reducing Trojan Activation Time

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Cited by 245 publications
(141 citation statements)
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References 18 publications
(20 reference statements)
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“…Salmani et al in [10] propose to modify the circuit description in order to increase the probabilities of signal when it is lower than a specific threshold. This is done with the insertion of so-called dummy scan flip-flops.…”
Section: B Hts Detection Methods Based On Ht Activationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Salmani et al in [10] propose to modify the circuit description in order to increase the probabilities of signal when it is lower than a specific threshold. This is done with the insertion of so-called dummy scan flip-flops.…”
Section: B Hts Detection Methods Based On Ht Activationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…low controllability signals, such as introduced in [10]. This idea is based on the assumption that it is likely that an attacker will attach a HT on signals having a low controllability.…”
Section: Rare Value Based Logic Encryptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Trojan [6] hidden is mainly bypassing the network security scanning and defensive behavior-based detection. Signature-based scanning hidden technologies: Trojan deformation technology and encryption technology.…”
Section: Hiding Program Of Web Malicious Codementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Salmani et al propose a technique to increase the node's toggle rate by inserting dummy flip-flop, making node's toggle rate more than preset threshold. When threshold set as 10-4, it needs adding 16 dummy flip-flops into s38417 benchmark and 0.8% area overhead [5]. Side-channel analysis-based approaches can detect Trojan by comparing the side-channel parameter of pending test and Trojan-free ICs without triggering Trojan [4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%