A Novel Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol With Dynamic Credential for WSNs

Abstract

Public key cryptographic primitive (e.g., the famous Diffie-Hellman key agreement, or public key encryption) has recently been used as a standard building block in authenticated key agreement (AKA) constructions for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) to provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS), where the expensive cryptographic operation (i.e., exponentiation calculation) is involved. However, realizing such complex computation on resource-constrained wireless sensors is inefficient and even impossible on some devices. In this work, we introduce a new AKA scheme with PFS for WSNs without using any public key cryptographic primitive. To achieve PFS, we rely on a new dynamic one-time authentication credential that is regularly updated in each session. In particular, each value of the authentication credential is wisely associated with at most one session key that enables us to fulfill the security goal of PFS. Furthermore, the proposed scheme enables the principals to identify whether they have been impersonated previously. We highlight that our scheme can be very efficiently implemented on sensors since only hash function and XOR operation are required.

A Secure and Lightweight Three‐Factor Remote User Authentication Protocol for Future IoT Applications

“…Security Functionality Comparisons. Table 3 summarizes the comparison of the functionality features of the recent user authentication protocols [1,8,33,45,50,60]. It can be observed that the proposed protocol offers improved security and functionality features, in comparison to the other recent protocols.…”

“…In this section, we compare our proposed protocol in terms of computation overhead with those of recent related protocols [1,8,33,45,50,60]. The protocol comprises four phases: user and sensor node registration phase, login phase, key agreement and authentication phase, and password and biometrics change phase.…”

“…According to the practical example of the computational costs in an environment with a CPU of 3.2 GHz and with 3.0 GB of RAM, the time complexity of one-way hash operations requires 0.02 ms when using SHA-1 and for the ECC encryption operation which requires 0.45 ms when using ECC-160 [63]. Therefore, the total computational overheads of our protocol are 0.36 ms. Table 4 summarizes the computational overheads of our proposed protocol and the existing protocols in [1,8,33,45,50,60] with approximate time (in milliseconds). It is clear that the proposed protocol requires less overall computation costs.…”

“…Usually, those sensor nodes are deployed in places that are easy for people to touch. Nowadays, one of the most possible critical security attacks that easily happen is a node captured attack where the authentication information that is inside the sensor node is revealed by physical crack [8]. Furthermore, new remote user authentication that is also possible could be vulnerable to this attack because the malicious attacker possibly obtained all sensitive authentication information through this attack.…”

VTE‐AKA: an optimum vector time encoding scheme for synchronising authenticated key agreements in cognitive radio ad hoc networks

“…ECC‐based optimal key pre‐distribution and session management schemes are proposed in [1, 2] for maintaining a significant trade‐off between node connectivity, resilience, and storage pre‐requisites. ECC two‐factor user authentication protocols for secure communications in ad hoc wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are proposed in [3, 4], which counter node impersonation, dictionary, node replay, node compromise, Man‐in‐the‐middle (MITM), and stolen‐verifier attacks, while maintaining perfect‐forward‐secrecy. The review further analyses the impact of prominent security threats viz.…”