A novel and provably secure authentication and key agreement scheme with user anonymity for global mobility networks

Abstract

Ubiquitous networks support the roaming service for mobile communication devices. The mobile user can use the services in the foreign network with the help of the home network. Mutual authentication plays an important role in the roaming services, and researchers put their interests on the authentication schemes. Recently, in 2016, Gope and Hwang found that mutual authentication scheme of He et al. for global mobility networks had security disadvantages such as vulnerability to forgery attacks, unfair key agreement, and destitution of user anonymity. Then, they presented an improved scheme. However, we find that the scheme cannot resist the off‐line guessing attack and the de‐synchronization attack. Also, it lacks strong forward security. Moreover, the session key is known to HA in that scheme. To get over the weaknesses, we propose a new two‐factor authentication scheme for global mobility networks. We use formal proof with random oracle model, formal verification with the tool Proverif, and informal analysis to demonstrate the security of the proposed scheme. Compared with some very recent schemes, our scheme is more applicable. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A Privacy Protection User Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme Tailored for the Internet of Things Environment: PriAuth

“…In scheme proposed by Wu et al, every time the gateway gives a new PID newMU for the user [4]. But in this case, there is a potential loss of synchronization problem: if the adversary blocks the PID newMU from being sent to the user, then the two parties may lose their synchronization.…”

“…Thus, only the gateway could learn the identities. As for the shared key between user and sensor, in some schemes, the gateway knows the shared key in schemes [6][7][8][11][12][13][14], while, in some others, the gateway does not know the key, they use Diffie-Hellman (DH) anonymous key agreement protocol to build the shared key [1,2,4,5,9,30]. As we have discussed, the gateway is not allowed to know the shared key in order to prevent a curious gateway from eavesdropping the sensor data.…”

“…Once some fixed information about the identities is used in a scheme, then this scheme could probably be tracked by an adversary. One possible solution is to update their masked identity every time like in the schemes shown in [4,7]. But these kinds of solutions are vulnerable to loss of synchronization attack.…”

“…In order to protect the identity of the user, the gateway will generate a new identity for them when it is requested [4]. But if an adversary prevents this new identity from being received by the user, the user could not update his old identity while the gateway has updated its stored version of the user's identity.…”

Smarter Way to Access Multiple Mobile Cloud Applications without Interoperability Issues

“…Context Aware Technology is developed to predict the frequent disconnections of communication over mobile devices [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17] die to the continuous flow of user's mobility. Quality of bandwidth may vary quickly based on user's mobility from one location to another.…”