A Note on the Posterior Mean of a Population Mean

Ericson, W. A.

doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1969.tb00794.x

Cited by 95 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Define the signal accuracy as t = 1/E Var Y . It can be shown (Ericson 1969) that E Y is a weighted average of the prior mean E and the signal Y :…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

Shang¹,

2016

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W e study the problem of information sharing in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. Our analysis shows that the retailer's incentive to share information strongly depends on nonlinear production cost, competition intensity, and whether the retailer can offer a contract to charge a payment for the information. Without information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information for free when production economy is large but has no incentive to do so when there is production diseconomy. With information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information when either production diseconomy/economy is large or competition is intense. We characterize the conditions under which the retailer shares information with none, one, or both of the manufacturers. We also show that the retailer prefers to sell information sequentially rather than concurrently to the manufacturers, whereas the manufacturers' preferences are reversed.

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“…Define the signal accuracy as t = 1/E Var Y . It can be shown (Ericson 1969) that E Y is a weighted average of the prior mean E and the signal Y :…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

Shang¹,

2016

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“…In terms of the new variable, h ( y ) becomes (2) and (3). the following tinear-quadratic optimal control problem in %': Furthermore, remembering that the EVSI is non-negative, the above problem is equivalent to max xz( 1) Note, however, that there is a twist to the problem in that the dynamics (5) evolve on the restricted "time" interval [sO,l], whereas we are interested in the optimal control function g*:[O,l] + %l; however, the action on the "preliminary" interval [O,sO] affects the (integral) control conditions (2) and (3).…”

Section: Appendix: Proof Of Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounds and properties of the expected value of sample information for a project-selection problem

Fatti

Mehrez

Pachter

1987

Naval Research Logistics

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In this article we extend the work of Mehrez and Stulman [5] on the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) to the expected value of sample information (EVSI) for a class of economic problems dealing with the decision to reject or accept an investment project. It is shown that shifting the mean of the underlying a priori distribution of X, the project's monetary value from zero in either direction will decrease the associated EVSI of Y, the random sampled information. A theorem is then presented which gives an upper bound on the EVSI over all distributions of Y, as well as the structure of the posterior mean E[X|Y] for which this upper bound is achieved. Finally, the case where E[X|Y] is linear in Y is discussed and its performance compared with that of the optimal case.

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“…The accuracy t i is proportional to the sample size when Y i is a sample mean from independent sampling. It can be shown (Ericson 1969) that…”

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confidence: 96%

Sharing Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies

2011

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This paper studies the incentive for vertical information sharing in competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale. We consider a model of two supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer selling to one retailer, with the retailers engaging in Cournot or Bertrand competition. For Cournot retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or at least one retailer's information is less accurate. A supply chain may become worse off when making its information more accurate or production diseconomy smaller, if such an improvement induces the firms in the rival supply chain to cease sharing information. For Bertrand retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or information is more accurate. Under Bertrand competition a manufacturer may be worse off by receiving information, which is never the case under Cournot competition. Information sharing in one supply chain triggers a competitive reaction from the other supply chain and this reaction is damaging to the first supply chain under Cournot competition but may be beneficial under Bertrand competition. This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.supply chain management, supply chain competition, information sharing

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A Note on the Posterior Mean of a Population Mean

Cited by 95 publications

References 2 publications

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

Bounds and properties of the expected value of sample information for a project-selection problem

Sharing Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies

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