A Note on the Definition of Physicalism

Abstract

Physicalism is incompatible with what is known as the possibility of zombies, that is, the possibility of a world physically like ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences. But it is compatible with what is known as the possibility of ghosts, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which there are additional nonphysical entities. In this paper we argue that a revision to the traditional definition of physicalism designed to accommodate the possibility of ghosts inadvertently accommodates what is known as the possibility of inverted spectra, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which colour experience is inverted. This consequence is unwelcome, because it is widely agreed that the possibility of inverted spectra is incompatible with physicalism. We argue for a revised definition of physicalism which resolves this problem. We then use our definition to argue that physicalism is not compatible with what is known as the possibility of blockers, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which additional nonphysical entities have prevented the existence of conscious experience. This undermines Stephan Leuenberger's (2008) attempt to defend physicalism from arguments which purport to establish the possibility of zombies.

Fisicalismo e o problema mente-cérebro: uma questão de definição

“…Objeções e dificuldades com relação às tentativas específicas de definição e solução do problema também foram identificadas (CRANE & MELLOR, 1990;FRANCESCOTTI, 2014;SCHAFFER, 2003;STURGEON, 1998). Diferentes iniciativas de superação das críticas acima mencionadas e apresentação de uma definição final do físico têm sido evidenciadas na literatura, assim como movimentos de fortalecimento das críticas já existentes (BISHOP, 2006;BLUMSON & TANG, 2015;BOKULICH, 2011;DOWELL, 2006a;GILLETT & WITMER, 2001;HELLMAN & THOMPSON, 1975;JUDISCH, 2008;MELNYK, 1997MELNYK, , 2001MELNYK, , 2003MONTERO, 2005;MONTERO & PAPINEAU, 2005;MSIMANG, 2015;NEY, 2008;PAPINEAU, 1991;POLAND, 2003;SMART, 1978;SPURRETT, 2001SPURRETT, , 2015STOLJAR, 2010STOLJAR, , 2001aSTOLJAR, , 2001b. Contudo, o fato de ainda ser possível identificar nas últimas décadas diferentes produções buscando discutir e propor definições da tese fisicalista, bem como publicações recentes sugerindo uma "nova definição de físico" (WITMER, 2016) e do fisicalismo (DOVE, 2016), são evidências suficientes para demonstrar a ausência de consenso dos critérios definicionais, devido às discordâncias relativas àquilo que a proposição irá abarcar, restringir e denotar pelo termo 'físico'.…”

Modal arguments against materialism

“…(on one common definition of “supervenience”) according to which every possible world physically indistinguishable from ours is indistinguishable from ours simpliciter. There are ways to refine this definition, but the purpose of such refinements is to overcome technical difficulties orthogonal to the aims of this paper; see (Chalmers, 1996, 38‐41), (Jackson, 1998, 9‐14), (Stoljar, 2010, 133‐39), and Blumson and Tang (2015).…”