animals; their rights could be violated, they could even be killed with impunity. 9 Other philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum, 10 Eva Kittay 11 and Anita Silvers, 12 tried to include persons with severe disabilities in a theory of justice, but could not overcome the obstacle presented by their perceived inability to make their own decisions. In these theories, persons with disabilities might deserve protection for other reasons, but they are not fully autonomous beings, their status is not equal to their fellow citizens. The lack of legal capacity of persons with severe disabilities remains a central obstacle to justifying their moral personhood. 13 As noted by Gerard Quinn, a long-standing advocate for disability rights, this is not simply a question of contract or legal status, it goes to the heart of whom we recognize as equal human beings. 14 Law is not the only cause of prejudices and stigma relating to the lack of rationality and cognitive skills of persons with disabilities, but greatly contributes to it. A legal system recognizing their abilities and validating them as autonomous decision-makers would treat them as equal citizens, subjects, not objects of the law. To achieve this change of status is the aim of this dissertation.
A. The existing landscape of legal capacity law9