A note on testing guilt aversion

Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Suetens, Sigrid

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.11.002

Cited by 34 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…22 Experiments using stated SOB should not ignore this effect as it leads to an upwardbias measure of the correlation between SOB and choices (see consistent results in Bellemare et al, 2017 andKhalmetski et al, 2015 We also find support for Result I1 using a Logit model with fixed effects (Table A9 in Appendix A) and with random effects and individual controls ( observation. For a given induced SOB, the frequency of Transfer choices does not significantly differ across conditions (smallest p = 0.438) (see also Table A10).…”

Section: Intermediaries' Behaviormentioning

confidence: 57%

Embezzlement and guilt aversion

Attanasi

Rimbaud

Villeval

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries' behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.

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Section: Intermediaries' Behaviormentioning

confidence: 57%

Embezzlement and guilt aversion

Attanasi

Rimbaud

Villeval

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Furthermore, numerous studies like Brandts andCharness (2011), Fischbacher et al (2012), and KOW find no evidence that the two methods yield qualitatively different results. A recent paper by Bellemare et al (2017b) compares three different methods for testing guilt aversion in a dictator game. The findings of that paper reveal that the strategy method yields very similar results to those obtained when second-order beliefs of dictators are elicited, and that the method based on disclosing recipients' first-order beliefs used by EJTT produces different results compared to the other two methods.…”

Section: Aggregate Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

The limits of guilt

Balafoutas

Fornwagner

2017

J Econ Sci Assoc

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According to the theory of guilt aversion, agents suffer a psychological cost whenever they fall short of other people's expectations. In this paper, we suggest that there may be limits to this kind of motivation. We present evidence from an experimental dictator game showing that behavior is consistent with guilt aversion for relatively low levels of recipient expectations, roughly up to the point where the recipient expects half of the available surplus. Beyond that point the relationship between expectations and transfers becomes negative. Moreover, we examine this relationship at the individual level and establish a typology of subjects depending on how and whether they condition their behavior on recipient expectations.

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“…Here, evidence for guilt aversion is mixed. While Reuben et al (2009), Bellemare et al (2017aBellemare et al ( & 2017b, and Khalmetski (2016) find evidence in favor of guilt aversion, Vanberg (2008), Ellingsen et al (2010), and Kawagoe & Narits (2014) do not find evidence in favor of guilt aversion. The most compelling explanation of this seemingly ambiguous state of the literature is that the effect of second-order beliefs on action is heterogeneous: Khalmetski et al (2015) find no aggregate effect of second-order beliefs on action.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion

Morell

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill the expectations of others, plays out more strongly if agents share an induced social identity. Participants play a dictator game in which they can condition their amount sent on recipients' beliefs. Dictators either play with a recipient from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). I find that the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much a dictator sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment. However, the way dictators react to very high expectations does not differ significantly between treatments. In contrast to previous work I do not find that amounts sent are an inversely u-shaped function of recipients' expectations. Rather, and independently of the treatment, participants tend to ignore very high expectations.

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A note on testing guilt aversion

Cited by 34 publications

References 20 publications

Embezzlement and guilt aversion

Embezzlement and guilt aversion

The limits of guilt

The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion

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