A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set

Pechersky, Sergei

doi:10.1007/s00182-014-0441-y

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is non-empty if and only if the game is convex (see e.g. Dehez, 2017;Gilles, 2010, p. 53;Pechersky, 2015;Shapley, 1965Shapley, , 1971.…”

Section: Formally Define the Triple Helix Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A cooperative game with transferable utility is convex if for any two coalitions S and T members of , the following inequality holds (see e.g. Dehez, 2017;Gilles, 2010, p. 53; 𝑃 Pechersky, 2015;Shapley, 1965Shapley, , 1971):…”

Section: Convexity and Strict Convexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A coreless game is unstable (Serrano 2007, p. 7); in other words, in such a game, players may form and leave coalitions each time their interests are not ensured. Game theorists demonstrated that the conditions for the core exists  i.e., the core is non-empty  is that the game is convex (see e.g., Dehez, 2017;Gilles, 2010, p. 53;Pechersky, 2015;Shapley, 1965Shapley, , p. 15, 1971.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Convexity of the triple helix of innovation game

Mêgnigbêto

2024

IJIS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose This paper aims to determine the conditions for the core of the Triple Helix game to exist. The Triple Helix of university-industry-government relationships is a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility. Then, the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus were used as indicators of the synergy within an innovation system. Whereas the Shapley value and the nucleolus always exist, the core may not. Design/methodology/approach The core of a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility exists only if and only if the game is convex. The paper applies the convexity condition to the Triple Helix game. Findings The Triple Helix game is convex if and only if there is output within the system; it is strictly convex if and only if all the three bilateral and the trilateral relationships have an output. Practical implications Convex games are competitive situations in which there are strong incentives towards the formation of large coalitions; therefore, innovation actors must cooperate to maximise their interests. Furthermore, a Triple Helix game may be split into subgames for comprehensive analyses and several Triple Helix games may be combined for a global study. Originality/value This paper extends the meaning of the Shapley value and the nucleolus for Triple Helix innovation actors: the Shapley value indicates the quantity a player wins because of the coalitions he involves in and the nucleolus the return for solidarity of an innovation actor.

show abstract

Section: Formally Define the Triple Helix Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Convexity and Strict Convexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Convexity of the triple helix of innovation game

Mêgnigbêto

2024

IJIS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It is interesting to notice that when the set of states of the world is finite, the Steiner point coincides with the Shapley value (Basili & Chateauneuf, 2020;Pechersky, 2015;Shapley, 1971) and it is easily computed via the following expression…”

Section: Aggregation and Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aggregation of Experts Judgments for Climate Tipping Points

Basili,

Crudu

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper introduces a method for the evaluation of the occurrence of tipping points based on the combination of probability intervals from experts judgments elicited in face-to-face interviews. The computation of such conditional probabilities is based on the aggregation of imprecise probability judgments through the Steiner point. The probability of a tipping point can be updated by the standard Bayes rule to generate tipping point scenarios. Our results suggest that tipping events may happen with relatively large probabilities, in contrast with the view that tipping points are low-probability-high-impact events. This suggests that mitigation and containment policies cannot be further postponed. JEL Classification: Q54; D81; C10

show abstract

Sustainable Development and Green Economy in the European Union Countries—Statistical Analysis

Cheba

Bąk

2020

Studies in Classification, Data Analysis, and Knowledge Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set

Cited by 8 publications

References 9 publications

Convexity of the triple helix of innovation game

Convexity of the triple helix of innovation game

Aggregation of Experts Judgments for Climate Tipping Points

Sustainable Development and Green Economy in the European Union Countries—Statistical Analysis

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About