People often make choices or form opinions depending on the social relations they have, but they also choose their relations depending on their preferred behavior and their opinions. Most of the existing models of coevolution of networks and individual behavior assume that actors are homogeneous. In this article, we relax this assumption in a context in which actors try to coordinate their behavior with their partners. We investigate with a game-theoretic model whether social cohesion and coordination change when interests of actors are not perfectly aligned as compared to the homogeneous case. Using analytical and simulation methods we characterize the set of stable networks and examine the consequences of heterogeneity for social optimality and segregation in emerging networks.We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. We also would like to thank Stephanie Rosenkranz, Werner Raub, Jeroen Weesie, Rense Corten, Bastian Westbrock, and Ines Lindner, as well as participants of the ISCORE seminar at the ICS in Utrecht and the 6th Workshop on Networks in Economics and Sociology: Dynamic Networks in Utrecht for useful suggestions and criticism.