A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain

Rees, Michael; Kopke, Jonathan E.; Pelletier, Ronald P.; Segev, Dorry L.; Rutter, Matthew E.; Fabrega, Alfredo J.; Rogers, Jeffrey; Pankewycz, O.; Hiller, Janet; Roth, Alvin E.; Sandholm, Tüomas; Ünver, M. Utku; Montgomery, Robert A.

doi:10.1056/nejmoa0803645

Cited by 283 publications

(207 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

201

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…natural settings, whether in workplace donations to charity (46) or the decision to donate organs (47). However, whether such "pay it forward" behavior spreads more widely from person to person to person in natural human networks remains an open question.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks

Fowler

Christakis

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

639

497

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks, but subjects in such studies can choose to befriend people with similar behaviors, posing difficulty for causal inference. Here, we exploit a seminal set of laboratory experiments that originally showed that voluntary costly punishment can help sustain cooperation. In these experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to a sequence of different groups to play a series of single-shot public goods games with strangers; this feature allowed us to draw networks of interactions to explore how cooperative and uncooperative behaviors spread from person to person to person. We show that, in both an ordinary public goods game and in a public goods game with punishment, focal individuals are influenced by fellow group members' contribution behavior in future interactions with other individuals who were not a party to the initial interaction. Furthermore, this influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of separation (from person to person to person to person). The results suggest that each additional contribution a subject makes to the public good in the first period is tripled over the course of the experiment by other subjects who are directly or indirectly influenced to contribute more as a consequence. These results show experimentally that cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks.behavioral economics | cooperation | public goods | social influence | pay-it-forward

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks

Fowler

Christakis

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

639

497

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Fielded kidney exchanges also gain great utility through the use of chains (see, e.g., [4,14,16,17,21,22,23,28]). Chains start with an altruistic donor donating his kidney to a patient, whose paired donor donates her kidney to another patient, and so on.…”

Section: Kidney Exchange Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price of Fairness in Kidney Exchange.

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Kidney exchange provides a life-saving alternative to long waiting lists for patients in need of a new kidney. Fielded exchanges typically match under utilitarian or near-utilitarian rules; this approach marginalizes certain classes of patients. In this paper, we focus on improving access to kidneys for highly-sensitized, or hard-tomatch, patients. Toward this end, we formally adapt a recently introduced measure of the tradeoff between fairness and efficiencythe price of fairness-to the standard kidney exchange model. We show that the price of fairness in the standard theoretical model is small. We then introduce two natural definitions of fairness and empirically explore the tradeoff between matching more hard-tomatch patients and the overall utility of a utilitarian matching, on real data from the UNOS nationwide kidney exchange and simulated data from each of the standard kidney exchange distributions.

show abstract

“…If a chain is initiated by an altruistic or non-directed donor, it could lead to multiple donations ending with a donor who is yet to donate, designated as a bridge donor (Figure 1c). This concept was introduced as Never Ending Altruistic Donor (NEAD) chains [9]. These transplants do not necessarily undergo simultaneously because of logistic issues and time involved in finding next compatible recipient.…”

Section: How Pekt Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paired Exchange: A New Innovation in Live Donor Kidney Transplantation

Arora¹

2014

J Nephrol Ther

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Barriers to traditional living-donor kidney transplantation include ABO incompatibility and positive cross-match. Paired exchange kidney transplantation (PEKT) is a viable an increasingly popular method to increase live donation. We discuss the pros and cons as well as the various ways to achieve PEKT along with a review of existing literature. To achieve the full potential of PEKT, the transplant community at large needs to work toward a national kidney paired donation program along with a centralized financial intermediary.

show abstract

A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain

Cited by 283 publications

References 18 publications

Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks

Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks

Price of Fairness in Kidney Exchange.

Paired Exchange: A New Innovation in Live Donor Kidney Transplantation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About