1988
DOI: 10.2307/2107978
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A Noncausal Theory of Agency

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Cited by 73 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…First, it might be argued that even if they can't be deterministically caused (since it's the libertarian view of free will that's at issue), a person's free choices can nevertheless be indeterministically (or probabilistically) caused because such causation is required in order for a person to act for a reason. However, following Goetz (, ), I argue that reasons explanations are teleological rather than causal in character. Specifically, (i) what makes it the case that a person chooses for a reason is not that the reason causes her choice but, instead, that she makes the choice in order to bring about a certain end or achieve a certain goal and (ii) this teleological explanation is not reducible to any causal explanation.…”
Section: Further Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, it might be argued that even if they can't be deterministically caused (since it's the libertarian view of free will that's at issue), a person's free choices can nevertheless be indeterministically (or probabilistically) caused because such causation is required in order for a person to act for a reason. However, following Goetz (, ), I argue that reasons explanations are teleological rather than causal in character. Specifically, (i) what makes it the case that a person chooses for a reason is not that the reason causes her choice but, instead, that she makes the choice in order to bring about a certain end or achieve a certain goal and (ii) this teleological explanation is not reducible to any causal explanation.…”
Section: Further Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some incompatibilists suppose that free choices must be uncaused (Ginet 2002(Ginet , 2007(Ginet , 2008(Ginet , 2016McCann 1998McCann , 2012Goetz 1988Goetz , 2008. Presumably, this rules out even probabilistic causation.…”
Section: Immunity From Prior Influencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, I will show that, until it is clearly proven that Kane needs the language of 'trying'/'willing', a variety of recent criticisms of his theory could be answered by Kane if he would simply avoid using such language, and instead employ only the language of 'wanting'. 2 For defenses of this view, see Ginet (1990Ginet ( , 2002, Goetz (1988Goetz ( , 1997, McCall (1994) and McCann (1998). 3 See Kane (1996Kane ( , 1999aKane ( , 1999bKane ( , 2000Kane ( , 2002Kane ( , 2007.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… For defenses of this view, see Ginet (1990, 2002), Goetz (1988, 1997), McCall (1994) and McCann (1998). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%