A Noncausal Theory of Agency

Goetz, Stewart

doi:10.2307/2107978

Cited by 73 publications

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“…First, it might be argued that even if they can't be deterministically caused (since it's the libertarian view of free will that's at issue), a person's free choices can nevertheless be indeterministically (or probabilistically) caused because such causation is required in order for a person to act for a reason. However, following Goetz (, ), I argue that reasons explanations are teleological rather than causal in character. Specifically, (i) what makes it the case that a person chooses for a reason is not that the reason causes her choice but, instead, that she makes the choice in order to bring about a certain end or achieve a certain goal and (ii) this teleological explanation is not reducible to any causal explanation.…”

Section: Further Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will

Palmer¹

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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According to the libertarian view of free will, people sometimes act freely, but this freedom is incompatible with causal determinism. Goetz (1997, 1998, 2008) has developed an important and unusual libertarian view of free will. Rather than simply arguing that a person's free actions cannot be causally determined, Goetz argues that they cannot be caused at all. According to Goetz, in order for a person to act freely, her actions must be uncaused.1 My aim in this essay is to evaluate Goetz's “noncausal” libertarian view of free will. In section 1, I outline Goetz's view. In section 2, I develop two criticisms of his view. In section 3, I develop an improved “positive” account of the noncausal view, which takes Goetz's metaphysical framework as its point of departure but is not subject to the criticisms that plague his development of this framework. Finally, in section 4, I respond to some objections to my proposed noncausal view.

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Section: Further Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will

Palmer¹

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…Some incompatibilists suppose that free choices must be uncaused (Ginet 2002(Ginet , 2007(Ginet , 2008(Ginet , 2016McCann 1998McCann , 2012Goetz 1988Goetz , 2008. Presumably, this rules out even probabilistic causation.…”

Section: Immunity From Prior Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

Elzein¹

2019

Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics

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While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly nonnaturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will.

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“…Consequently, I will show that, until it is clearly proven that Kane needs the language of 'trying'/'willing', a variety of recent criticisms of his theory could be answered by Kane if he would simply avoid using such language, and instead employ only the language of 'wanting'. 2 For defenses of this view, see Ginet (1990Ginet ( , 2002, Goetz (1988Goetz ( , 1997, McCall (1994) and McCann (1998). 3 See Kane (1996Kane ( , 1999aKane ( , 1999bKane ( , 2000Kane ( , 2002Kane ( , 2007.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…2 2 For defenses of this view, see Ginet (1990, 2002), Goetz (1988, 1997), McCall (1994) and McCann (1998). …”

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confidence: 99%

Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will

Lemos

2011

Dialectica

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Robert Kane's event‐causal libertarian theory of free will has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. In response to the luck objection, he has provided an ambiguous answer which results in additional criticisms that are avoidable. I explain Kane's theory, the luck objection and Kane's reply to the problem of luck. I note that in some places he suggests that the dual wantings of agents engaged in self‐forming actions (SFAs) provides the key to answering the luck objection, whereas in other places he suggests that the dual willings or tryings of agents is the key. Various philosophers criticize Kane's view by focusing on his concept of the dual willings/tryings involved in SFAs. I argue that despite Kane's efforts to answer these criticisms, they still hold; but I also go on to argue that Kane can avoid these criticisms and also answer the luck objection by just focusing on the important role of the dual wantings in SFAs.

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A Noncausal Theory of Agency

Cited by 73 publications

References 0 publications

Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will

Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will

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