A new residential demand response management method based on a social welfare optimization framework

Demand response programs maximum participation aiming to reduce negative effects on distribution networks

“…Indeed, it is assumed that changing the price range can lead to shift the residential consumers' load in order to implement punishment policies of DRPs as much as 20% and for commercial, official buildings, and governmental consumers, 12% 22‐23 . Evidently, in the studies done without considering consumers' level of welfare, 3,9 the percentage of increase in the consumption of consumers in the off‐peak hours and the decrease of the consumption of consumers in the peak hours is more than these amounts and even 30% is considered for the decrease of peak of load curve 9 .…”

“…Evidently, in the studies done without considering consumers' level of welfare, 3,9 the percentage of increase in the consumption of consumers in the off‐peak hours and the decrease of the consumption of consumers in the peak hours is more than these amounts and even 30% is considered for the decrease of peak of load curve 9 . But, the level of welfare among consumers which is defined as the expectation time in using facilities can be effective in load shifting from peak hours to off‐peak hours 22 . In studies where the consumers' welfare level is considered as a restrictive factor in DRPs, the percentage of load shifting potential is gained much lesser than the mentioned amount 22‐23 …”

“…But, the level of welfare among consumers which is defined as the expectation time in using facilities can be effective in load shifting from peak hours to off‐peak hours 22 . In studies where the consumers' welfare level is considered as a restrictive factor in DRPs, the percentage of load shifting potential is gained much lesser than the mentioned amount 22‐23 …”

Dynamic incentive framework for demand response in distribution system using moving time horizon control

“…The main challenge in the path of implementation of DR programme is the low participation rate with the reasons being lack of awareness and/or motivation regarding the TOU price signals and incentive programmes offered by load serving entity (LSE)/ aggregator [4,5]. The other price-based approaches for demand response programmes have used real-time pricing method to monitor the customer load pattern via smart metering scheme [6]. In [7], the neighbouring communication strategies about load changes in price-based approaches are used to employ aggregated game-based demand response programme.…”

“…In centralised RDR, the utility or aggregator collects the information of the responsive loads and schedules them in order to improve the system performance. In [6], the authors proposed an incentivebased approach to operate the RDR and observed the overall peak load reduction. The other incentive-based programmes have used different mechanisms.…”