A new path: Why we need critical approaches to cognitive and psychological sciences.

Abstract

The issue of generalizability in psychological and cognitive sciences is best understood in the broader context and history of the disciplines and human research in general. Interrelated issues around the use of normativity in supporting hierarchical (e.g., White supremacist) views of humanity demonstrate the need for the discipline to reconsider currently accepted ways of doing things. Bauer (2023) contributes to this needed discussion by focusing on the seemingly intractable problem of dealing with generalization in psychological research. In the current piece, I pick up on Bauer's suggestion of a new path for the discipline and outline a framework for a critical approach to psychological and cognitive sciences. This broad approach represents an alternative way forward for researchers in our understanding of how normativity and generalization interact with our work. A critical approach also necessitates a reevaluation of our current characterization of humans' cognitive and psychological processes.

Recognizing limits on the generalizability of findings of psychological science research.

“…The authors of the commentaries also highlight that these issues are especially critical when we have in mind not just behavior in the laboratory but in the world beyond it-that is, as we attempt to apply the findings of our research to classrooms, workplaces, and courtrooms, to name a few (Mitchell & Shivde, 2023;Otgaar et al, 2023). They reinforce the need for attention to cultural background, individual variability, methodological variations, and other sources of variance between and among participants that may limit generalizability of findings (Peterson, 2023;Prather, 2023). In short, there is general agreement that it is timely and important to attend to issues of generalizability (Devezer & Buzbas, 2023).…”

“…The second unwarranted characterization is that the target article argues the case that “studies should produce easy to generalize results,” based on a “normative” human who is an able-bodied White man, and that failures to generalize beyond this “generic default person” are interpreted as evidence of deficits in the populations who do not look like, sound like, or behave like the “default” or “normative” human (Prather, 2023, pp. 195–196).…”

“…By way of a final comment, I emphasize that there is no one way to “do” psychological science. Just as there is not a “normative” human (Prather, 2023), nor is there a “normative” way to do psychological science research. We may recognize the desirability of moving to a more model-centric approach (Devezer & Buzbas, 2023).…”

“…As we work to establish ourselves as productive scholars and researchers, advance our reputations, and demonstrate that our work is innovative and impactful, we seemingly shrink from admitting that each experiment or study we conduct and publish suffers from limitations, some of which are on generalizability of findings. Using the Müller-Lyer illusion as an example (Müller-Lyer, 1889), Prather (2023) explicitly reminds us that findings may be interesting and important, even if they are not universal. And when they are not universal-or may not be-it is incumbent upon us to say so.…”

“…Lest all these "demands" for doing more to recognize potential limits on the generalizability of findings seem daunting (even tempting some to "do something else": Yarkoni, 2022, p. 8), the fourth pointer to a way forward is to caution against hamstringing the field by demanding that all effects generalize broadly (Mitchell & Shivde, 2023). This would be a fool's errand, given that there is no reason to expect that any given sample on which an effect was observed is "normative" or informs a "default" human condition (Prather, 2023). There is nothing wrong with pursuing effects that may hold for one group or under one set of conditions but not generalize beyond them.…”