A New Model of Corporatism in States Governed by Populist Political Parties: The Cases of Poland and Hungary

Abstract

<jats:p>Between 1945 and 2010 three main types of corporatism were discussed in the political science literature: the ‘classic’ and ‘lean’ corporatism that existed in the West European countries and the ‘illusory’ corporatism that dominated in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. The aim of the paper is to examine whether a new version of corporatism, which I call ‘patronage’ corporatism, emerged in Hungary and Poland during the first term of the governments formed by populist political parties (in Hungary between 2010 and 2014 and in Poland between 2015 and 2019). In patronage corporatism the authorities autonomously conduct heterodox economic policy. They enter into alliances only with ideologically close trade unions. While their cronies legitimize authorities’ decisions at the governmental level vis-à-vis the citizens and at the international level, the government fulfils some of their socio-economic and organizational demands. Furthermore, the government cooperates with its allies to destroy other trade unions that are perceived as hostile towards the authorities. The paper shows that the capture of power by populist parties in Hungary and Poland led to the development of patronage corporatism in these countries.</jats:p>

Exploring the domestic and international drivers of professionalization of Central and Eastern European interest groups

“…However, unlike Maloney et al (2018), we found EU funding to be less important for professionalization than support from national governments. In line with Fraussen (2014) and Olejnik (2020), our data indeed show a 'visible hand' of the state in promoting organizational professionalization.…”

“…However, there has been a recent boom in analyses of organized interests in the region. Scholars have covered, among other things, population ecologies Rozbicka and Kamiński, 2021) and advocacy strategies (Rozbicka et al, 2020;Czarnecki, 2021), while also exploring state-interest group interactions (Ost, 2011;Olejnik, 2020;Dobbins and Riedel, 2021) and lobbying regimes (Vargovčíková, 2017;Rozbicka et al, 2020). Most recently, observers have also produced studies on the concrete impact of organized interests on policymaking (Horváthová and Dobbins, 2019;Rozbicka et al, 2020).…”

“…An increasing number of groups in the playing field is prompting organized interests to professionalize, hence suggesting a link between density and professionalization. Second, Models 4 and 5 add weight to the observation about patronage corporatism (Olejnik, 2020): although the effect is relatively weak despite statistical significance, organizations benefiting from state subsidies and actively coordinating with the state appear to be funneling resulting material and nonmaterial resources into further professionalization, which in turn further consolidates their symbiotic relationship with the state. The state in turn may draw on such organizations to garner public support for its policy agenda, likely to the detriment of excluded organizations.…”

Towards energy policy corporatism in Central and Eastern Europe?

“…While scholars have made some headway in addressing corporatist interest intermediation in post-communist economic policy-making (Jahn 2016;Avdagic 2005;Olejnik 2020;Ost 2000), advocacy patterns in other areas remain largely underresearched. Corporatism is a standard analytical paradigm in political science, which grasps systematized negotiations between major social partners.…”

“…He classifies them as "patronage corporatist" to the extent that they purportedly actively divide organized interests into allies required for reaching political objectives and hostile organizations lacking the "necessary moral authority to advocate for the interests of the citizenry" (Olejnik 2020, 184). Accordingly, governments tend to only engage in political consultations and exchange with social partners with coinciding interests, many of whom often receive government funding, while rivalling organizations are actively discredited and combatted (Olejnik 2020).…”