A New Framework for Power Control in Wireless Data Networks: Games, Utility, and Pricing

Abstract

We develop a new framework for distributed power control for wireless data based on the economic principles of utility and pricing. Utility is defined as the measure of satisfaction that a user derives from accessing the wireless data network. Properties of utility functions are introduced and a specific function, based on throughput per terminal battery lifetime including forward error control, is presented and shown to conform to those properties. Users enter into a non-cooperative game to maximize their individual utilities by adjusting their transmitter powers. A unique Nash equilibrium for the above game is shown to exist but is not Pareto efficient. A pricing function is then introduced which leads to Pareto improvements for the non-cooperative game.

A Users’ Satisfaction Driven Scheduling Strategy for Wireless Multimedia QoS

“…Finally, from a theoretical point-of-view it could be possible to study within the given framework the behaviour of a more general scheduling strategy, in which the revenue maximisation is considered as the goal of the optimisation problem (8)- (9). This study, that can allow to gain a better understanding of the RRM issues, is left for future research.…”

“…Different types of utility functions can be introduced to model different kinds of service, as discussed in [9]. For example, discrete-value utilities (i.e., combination of step functions) are an appropriate characterisation for the simplest kinds of traffic, like GSM-like voice call.…”

A passivity approach to game-theoretic CDMA power control

“…An alternative approach, pursued in Falomari, Mandayam, and Goodman (1998), Ji and Huang (1998), Alpcan, Başar, Srikant, and Altman (2002), , Saraydar, Mandayam, and Goodman (2001), Sung and Wong (1999), is to study the power control problem as an uncooperative game (Başar & Olsder, 1995), in which each user attempts to minimize its own cost function (or maximize its utility function) in response to the actions of others. Falomari et al (1998) investigated possible utility functions for both voice and data sources, and showed the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.…”

“…Falomari et al (1998) investigated possible utility functions for both voice and data sources, and showed the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. A linear pricing scheme was also proposed in Falomari et al (1998) to achieve a Pareto improvement in the utilities of mobiles.…”

“…Falomari et al (1998) investigated possible utility functions for both voice and data sources, and showed the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. A linear pricing scheme was also proposed in Falomari et al (1998) to achieve a Pareto improvement in the utilities of mobiles. Alpcan et al (2002) and proposed a power control game, where the cost function is defined as the difference between a pricing function and a logarithmic, strictly concave, utility function of the SIR of the mobiles.…”