Economics Letters

1985

DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(85)90249-6

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A new formula for the Shapley value

Norman L. Kleinberg¹,

Jeffrey H. Weiss²

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An Inventory Of Solutions1

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1985

1985

2019

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Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Other formulas for the Shapley value are due to Kleinberg and Weiss (1985), Rothblum (1985), and Béal et al (2012b).…”

Section: An Inventory Of Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Game Theory

²

2015

International Encyclopedia of the Social &Amp; Behavioral Sciences

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No abstract

“…Other formulas for the Shapley value are due to Kleinberg and Weiss (1985), Rothblum (1985), and Béal et al (2012b).…”

Section: An Inventory Of Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Game Theory

²

2015

International Encyclopedia of the Social &Amp; Behavioral Sciences

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No abstract

“…For other expressions of the Shapley value see for instanceKleinberg and Weiss (1985) orRothblum (1988).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Biodiversity, Shapley value and phylogenetic trees: some remarks

¹

2019

J. Math. Biol.

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This paper explores the main differences between the Shapley values of a set of taxa introduced by Haake et al.

Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games

¹

,

²

2007

Int J Game Theory

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We show that to each linear solution that has the inessential game property, there is an inner product on the space of games such that the solution to each game is the best additive approximation of the game (w.r.t. the norm derived from this inner product). If the space of games has an inner product, then the function that to each game assigns the best additive approximation of this game (w.r.t. to the norm derived from this inner product) is a linear solution that has the inessential game property. Both claims remain valid also if solutions are required to be efficient. JEL Classification: C78

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