A new double‐market parallel trading mechanism for competitive electricity markets

Shang, Jin; Jiang, Xin; Gao, Jinfeng; Fu, Keyuan; Wen, Fushuan

doi:10.1049/rpg2.12422

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…At present, the spot market in Guangdong, Gansu, and other places has adopted centralized trading, if some market players exercise market power in the trading process, it will bring risks and losses to the whole market as well as related members [4][5]. In the process of power market transactions, whether market power risk can be effectively monitored and prevented has become an important factor in promoting power market reform [6][7][8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study of coupled incentive-based clearing mechanisms in electricity markets considering uncertainty risk

Zhao,

Huang,

Pan

et al. 2024

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

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Promoting the construction of the electricity spot market and considering the market-oriented trading mode with joint participation of the generation side and load side and fair competition will be the trend of future development of the electricity spot market. The unit generation bidding strategy is adjusted by this paper based on incentive factors and an incentive-based clearing mechanism is designed for market coupling. To establish a coupled two-layer model of the power market, the upper layer of the heterogeneous generator bidding strategy modeling, the lower layer of the incentive-based market clearing mechanism modeling. On this basis, a spot market model is designed in which both the generation and user sides participate in peaking, and the peaking resources on the generation side and the user side are included in the market mechanism bidding. This paper’s clearing cost can save 854.42 yuan compared to the unified clearing mechanism in the bidding stage for clearing the total market electricity energy volume of 1000kW. The total carbon emissions are reduced by 5816.8 tons in a single day when compared to the single electric energy trading mechanism, which is based on the market-coupled incentive system. The market model proposed in the paper can effectively improve the level of new energy consumption and provide a useful reference for the design of the electricity market in regions with a high proportion of new energy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study of coupled incentive-based clearing mechanisms in electricity markets considering uncertainty risk

Zhao,

Huang,

Pan

et al. 2024

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Previous studies on the power market transaction model focused on a single power market, which could not adapt to the reality of the increasing scale of interprovincial transmission, and the market clearing model is the future research trend [25,26]. In addition, the continuous expansion of the proportion of new energy and the continuous emergence of new market players have brought great challenges to the current trading mechanism, and the establishment of a variety of product portfolio clearing models can fully stimulate market vitality [27].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing Power Market Clearing with Segmented Electricity Prices: A Bilevel Model

Wang,

Ni,

Shi

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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The energy sector plays a critical role in reducing emissions by transitioning to renewable energy. However, integrating renewable energy into the electricity market impacts market clearing. This article investigates market clearing decisions of renewable and traditional energy companies, considering electricity price segmentation. We propose an interprovincial bilevel market clearing decision-making model. The upper level optimizes the provincial market through a unilateral bidding model, minimizing the operating cost of the power market as the objective function. Meanwhile, the lower level optimizes power purchases by minimizing the cost of acquiring interprovincial renewable energy. A case study was conducted to determine the optimal interprovincial renewable energy purchasing power for multiple energy generation companies, considering the minimum market operating cost and segmented electricity prices. The proposed bilevel market clearing model captures the interplay between intraprovincial and interprovincial transactions, integrating electricity price and ecological attributes. By solving this model, we can attain optimal interprovincial electricity purchase of renewable energy, minimizing the overall market operating cost in the province. Through simulation, 18% of interprovincial transactions are needed to absorb 7.21 KWH of renewable energy from other provinces. When considering price segmentation, the cross-provincial two-level market clearing model can reduce the market cost by CNY 1,554,700.

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Trading strategy for virtual power plant clusters based on a multi-subject game model

Wan,

Wen,

Tang

et al. 2023

JCM

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With the rapid development of renewable energy and the continuous growth of new loads, VPP has become an important form of smart grid and energy internet due to its flexible and effective management of distributed energy. During the operation of Virtual power plant, there is a game relationship between the system operator and VPP, and they are in a non-complete information environment. However, most of the current game optimization modeling is under the condition of complete information, and the game model based on complete information cannot solve this problem. This article focuses on the VPP cluster trading problem based on non-complete information game theory, constructs a Bayesian game model for multiple VPPs with multiple subjects under the master-slave game framework by introducing the Bayesian concept to optimize the cluster transactions within VPPs, and verifies the effectiveness of the model through simulation experiments. The experimental results show that the multi-VPP multi-subject Bayesian game model established in the study can guarantee the privacy of each subject and effectively reduce PAR, thus ensuring the security and stability of the VPP network and reducing cost expenditures, which has practicality in actual VPP cluster transactions.

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A new double‐market parallel trading mechanism for competitive electricity markets

Cited by 3 publications

References 17 publications

A study of coupled incentive-based clearing mechanisms in electricity markets considering uncertainty risk

A study of coupled incentive-based clearing mechanisms in electricity markets considering uncertainty risk

Optimizing Power Market Clearing with Segmented Electricity Prices: A Bilevel Model

Trading strategy for virtual power plant clusters based on a multi-subject game model

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