A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII)

Thomson, Robert; Arregui, Javier; Leuffen, Dirk; Costello, Rory; Cross, James; Hertz, Robin; Jensen, Thomas E.

doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.662028

Cited by 112 publications

(125 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…5. For applications of the spatial model and the closely related veto players theory (Tsebelis 2002) to the analysis of EU decision making, see Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) and Thomson et al (2012). 6.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, it is worth searching for influence of enlargement directly on these two aspects of legislative decisionmaking in the Council of Ministers, where most of the conflicts between the member states are played out. This section of the article reports analyses based on two different and complementary data sources -member states' policy positions measured in the framework of the DEU-II project (Thomson et al 2012) and voting records. Previous studies also use indirect proxies for member states' preferences, such as socioeconomic fundamentals (König and Bräuninger 2004;Zimmer et al 2005) and governing party policy platforms (Veen 2011).…”

Section: Preference Heterogeneity and The Nature Of The Conflict Spacmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, let us look into the issue position data 10 derived from the DEU-II project (Thomson et al 2012). Analysing this data graphically with a multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis, Thomson (2009Thomson ( : 767, 2011 finds evidence that the post-2004 member states contribute to a new East-West conflict dimension, but one related to a relatively small proportion of all policy issues.…”

Section: Preference Heterogeneity and The Nature Of The Conflict Spacmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European Union

Toshkov

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

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This contribution investigates the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European Union. On the basis of new data on the number and types of legal acts produced by the EU and on the time between the proposal and adoption of legislative acts (1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012), the contribution argues that enlargement has had a rather limited impact on legislative production and duration and that it is extremely hard to disentangle this impact from other contemporaneous institutional and socioeconomic developments. On the basis of analyses of expert-based policy positions of member states in EU negotiations and on voting data from the Council of Ministers of the EU, it is argued that enlargement has possibly added a new dimension of contestation in EU legislative decision-making, but one that concerns a relatively small share of all negotiations in few policy fields like environment. All in all, there is no evidence that the Eastern enlargement has led to the institutional gridlock and loss of decision-making capacity that the public, many politicians and some academics as well have feared.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Preference Heterogeneity and The Nature Of The Conflict Spacmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Preference Heterogeneity and The Nature Of The Conflict Spacmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European Union

Toshkov

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Our analyses are based on information from the DEUII dataset, a detailed description of which is given in and Thomson et al (2012). The information consists of key informants' estimates of the stated policy preferences of the Commission, each member state and the EP on 274 specific controversial issues that were raised by 112 legislative proposals.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?

Costello¹,

Thomson²

2013

Journal of European Public Policy

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The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the EU institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. We assess how the codecision procedure works in practice using data on the preferences of legislative actors on a large number of proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on the relative bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that, in comparison to the consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP and weakened the Commission.However, the Council holds certain bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP has not achieved parity with the Council under codecision.

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“…The multi-dimensional spatial conception of political competition dates back to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and it has become standard practice in the US with the works on (roll call) voting behavior in Congress (McCarty et al, 2008;Poole, 2005;Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Then, this practice has moved to Europe both at national level with the Comparative Manifesto Project (Gabel and Hix, 2002;Gabel and Huber, 2000;Budge, 2001;Klingemann, 2006) and at the EU level with the project Resolving Controversy in the EU (Thomson et al, 2006(Thomson et al, , 2012Thomson, 2011) and the study of the European Parliament's party system (Bakker et al, 2012;Hix et al, 2006). The literature on interest group influence should follow these steps (see also Bunea and Ibenskas, 2016).…”

Section: Preference Attainment and Dimensionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

studying preference attainment using spatial models

Vannoni

Dür

2017

Eur Polit Sci

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Interest group influence represents the Higgs boson of contemporary social research. Scholars have tried to define and measure influence for decades: tens of different definitions are used in the literature and as many methods to measure it can be found. The literature has recently converged towards an agreement on how to study interest group influence: preference attainment. The latter has monopolised the research in the literature in the last years. Yet, a discussion on what preference attainment is, what it does and what it does not is still missing in the literature. This works aims to fill this gap by providing a theoretical and methodological informed discussion on interest group influence and preference attainment. In so doing, I propose a novel method to apply preference attainment in an effective and efficient manner.

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A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII)

Cited by 112 publications

References 40 publications

The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European Union

The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European Union

The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?

studying preference attainment using spatial models

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