A new class of security oriented error correcting robust codes

Rabii, Hila; Keren, Osnat

doi:10.1007/s12095-018-0340-3

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…In this paper, we consider and optimize architectures that are designed to handle natural and malicious faults. The architectures are based on a recent code construction, the Rabii-Keren (RK) codes [26] in their generalized form [27].…”

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confidence: 99%

Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules

2020

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Today’s electronic systems must simultaneously fulfill strict requirements on security and reliability. In particular, their cryptographic modules are exposed to faults, which can be due to natural failures (e.g., radiation or electromagnetic noise) or malicious fault-injection attacks. We present an architecture based on a new class of error-detecting codes that combine robustness properties with a minimal distance. The new architecture guarantees (with some probability) the detection of faults injected by an intelligent and strategic adversary who can precisely control the disturbance. At the same time it supports automatic correction of low-multiplicity faults. To this end, we discuss an efficient technique to correct single nibble/byte errors while avoiding full syndrome analysis. We also examine a Compact Protection Code (CPC)-based system level fault manager that considers this code an inner code (and the CPC as its outer code). We report experimental results obtained by physical fault injection on the SAKURA-G FPGA board. The experimental results reconfirm the assumption that faults may cause an arbitrary number of bit flips. They indicate that a combined inner–outer coding scheme can significantly reduce the number of fault events that go undetected due to erroneous corrections of the inner code.

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Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules

2020

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“…In a recent paper Rabii and Keren introduced a construction for a new class of non-linear robust q-ary codes with q = 2 m and error correction capability [22]. The RK codes have higher code rate than concatenated codes, and at the same time, they are more effective [23]. Rabii and Keren did not present encoding, decoding, and error correction algorithms, and their code was not implemented and tested in a realistic environment.…”

Section: Definition 2 (Robust Codes)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The code is built upon systematic linear codes [n, k, d] q where the n − k redundant symbols that were originally allocated to increase the minimum distance of the code, are modified to provide both correction capability and robustness. The following (generalized) definition of the RK code is taken from [23].…”

Section: Definition 2 (Robust Codes)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For odd values of m, the best function to use is the cubic function, f (x) = x 3 , which is an invertible APN function of (relatively) small implementation cost [23]. However, as shown in [23], it is possible to use other functions, for example f (x) = x −1 , with even values of m and to pay with a higher error masking probability Q(e). Namely, the error masking probability of the codes is Q(e) ≤ 2/q for odd values of m and 4/q for even m.…”

Section: Definition 2 (Robust Codes)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

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Detection and Correction of Malicious and Natural Faults in Cryptographic Modules

Karp

Keren

Polian

Kalpa Publications in Computing

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Today's electronic systems must simultaneously fulfill strict requirements on security and reliability. In particular, their cryptographic modules are exposed to faults, which can be due to natural failures (e.g., radiation or electromagnetic noise) or malicious faultinjection attacks. We present an architecture based on a new class of error-detecting codes that combine robustness properties with a minimal distance. The new architecture guarantees (with some probability) the detection of faults injected by an intelligent and strategic adversary who can precisely control the disturbance. At the same time it supports automatic correction of low-multiplicity faults. To this end, we discuss an efficient technique to correct single errors while avoiding full syndrome analysis. We report experimental results obtained by physical fault injection on the SAKURA-G FPGA board.

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