A New Approach to the Analysis of Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Kartal, Melis; Müller, Wieland

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3222964

Cited by 15 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…The patterns are also consistent with predictions of Kartal and Müller (2018), who develop a model with heterogeneous players and private information. Although both theoretical frameworks focus on heterogeneity in terms of the strength of social preferences, social preferences are not key to the argument.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

“…Finally, the assumption that players are informed about each other's type may not be realistic, especially in the context of anonymous lab experiments. It seems more realistic to assume instead that players are privately informed about their type and have common knowledge about the distribution of types in the population, as in Kartal and Müller (2018). Doing so does not change the direction of the predicted treatment effects.…”

Section: Reconsidering the Treatment Effects On Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this literature (exogenously imposed) sequentiality of moves increases contributions compared to a simultaneous-move setting if the leader has private information about the parameters of the game (Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund, 2005) but leads to mixed results in full information settings (for example Andreoni et al, 2002;Güth et al, 2007). 5 Finally, inspired by a model with hetero-geneous types and private information, Kartal and Müller (2018) also compare indefinitely repeated sequential-and simultaneous-move PDs but only focus on the case where cooperation cannot be sustained in equilibrium. We discuss the paper in more detail in the final paragraph of section 5.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that in the model ofKartal and Müller (2018) social preferences (or tastes for cooperation) are specified such that the cooperation rate of first movers cannot be lower than the conditional cooperation rate of second movers.20 In all of our treatments with δ > δ * these conditions are fulfilled.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games

Ghidoni

Suetens

2019

SSRN Journal

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Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

Section: Reconsidering the Treatment Effects On Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games

Ghidoni

Suetens

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…They observe slightly lower cooperation rates with repeated as compared to pre-play communication. Kühn (2014a and2014b) compare treatments with structured and free-form communication via a chat interface, and find that cooperation rates are higher with free-form communication (see also Bigoni et al, 2018;Kartal and Müller, 2018).…”

Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

Dvorak

Fehrler

2017

SSRN Journal

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Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

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Cooperation in stochastic games: a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

Kloosterman

2019

Exp Econ

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A New Approach to the Analysis of Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Cited by 15 publications

References 76 publications

Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games

Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games

Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

Cooperation in stochastic games: a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

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