A new approach to determine the distributional effects of quota management in fisheries

Abstract

Quota allocation mechanisms have distributional effects that are highly relevant to the economic organization of fisheries. In France, where fishing allocations are non-transferable, quotas are shared among Producer Organizations (POs) based on the historical landings of their members. Each PO is then responsible for implementing their own internal rules that provide individual or collective allocations to their members. This study investigates the distributional effects of the various quota management systems adopted by POs on quotas and production for the Bay of Biscay sole fishery. A comparison between initial allocations by vessel based on historical landings and actual observed landings is presented. Inequality metrics are used to quantify distributional effects, and a new method that is based on the decomposability property of the Theil index is introduced. Results show that the French management system successfully avoided concentration of production while reducing the fishing capacity through decommissioning schemes. The non-transferability of fishing allocations is a critical element that favored this outcome by allowing POs to control the distribution of catch shares in the fishery. Besides, it appears that the allocation strategies developed by POs were notably influenced by their local roots and their fishing fleet profiles. The various quota allocation systems among POs had contrasting effects on vessels' production, including greater equity within particular subfleets, benefits to vessels most dependent on sole in most POs, and benefits to the small-scale fisheries in a few POs. Highlights ► The role of producer organizations in the French quota management system is critical. ► Reduction of fleet capacity was achieved without concentration of production. ► Non-transferability of allocations favored greater equity in the fishery. ► Producer organizations' allocation strategies are influenced by their local identity. ► The Theil index offers some unique advantages to analyze distributional changes.

Contributing to Fisheries Sustainability: Inequality Analysis in the High Seas Catches of Countries

“…The Gini index was also used by Da Rocha and Sempere [54] to measure the redistributive effects of restricting the tradability of individual transferable quotas. Bellanger et al [38] used the Theil index and its decomposability property to determine the distributional effects of various quota allocation systems among producer organizations. Unlike these articles, our study does not set out to assess the distributional effect of a particular management fisheries policy, but rather to show the unequal use of worldwide fisheries resources over time.…”

“…This distinction can be measured via the decomposition property of the Theil index. Bellanger et al [38] applied a similar approach to study the distributional effects of quota management on vessel production when the vessels are classified by subfleets or length classes.…”

Fishers’ opinions on marketization of property rights and the quota system in France

“…Vessels using the quota managed by the fisheries administration do not benefit from historical rights and the principle of first come first served is applied. Therefore, some small-scale fishers decided to secure their catches by joining POs, in an attempt to organize their work throughout the year [17,12].…”

“…In France, vessels without quota (i.e. historical rights) do not obtain the same price as those with quota when they are sold [17,18]. In a vessel transaction, an agreement between buyer and vendor must be approved by the POs and is then submitted to the national advisory committee of quota for its approval.…”

Investigating trade-offs in alternative catch share systems: an individual-based bio-economic model applied to the Bay of Biscay sole fishery

“…Following increasing constraints on their Bay of Biscay sole sub-quotas compared to resource 150 availability, POs have developed various management systems including individual quotas, each PO 151 being free to determine their own rules for quota allocation (Bellanger et al 2016). Management 152 rules are decided at the board of directors in each PO and can vary from year to year according to 153 stock abundance and thus to risks of quota overruns or of unbalanced distribution of catch among 154 seasons or among fleets.…”