A new approach to analysing human-related accidents by combined use of HFACS and activity theory-based method

Abstract

(2017) A new approach to analysing human-related accidents by combined use of HFACS and activity theory-based method.Cognition, Technology and Work, 19 (4). pp. 759-783. ISSN 1435-5566 Final accepted version (with author's formatting)This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/23629/ Copyright:Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University's research available electronically.Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study without prior permission and without charge.Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the author's name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pagination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the date of the award.If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:eprints@mdx.ac.ukThe item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. ABSTRACTThis study proposes a new method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents. It integrates HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System), which addresses most of the socio-technical system levels and offers a comprehensive failure taxonomy for analysing human errors, and AT (Activity Theory)-based approach, which provides an effective way for considering various contextual factors systematically in accident investigation. By combining them, the proposed method makes it more efficient to use the concepts and principles of AT. Additionally, it can help analysts use HFACS taxonomy more coherently to identify meaningful causal factors with a sound theoretical basis of human activities. Therefore, the proposed method can be effectively used to mitigate the limitations of traditional approaches to accident analysis, such as over-relying on a causality model and sticking to a root-cause, by making analysts look at an accident from a range of perspectives.To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method, we conducted a case study in nuclear power plants. Through the case study, we could confirm that it would be a useful method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents, enabling analysts to identify a plausible set of causal factors efficiently in a methodical consideration of contextual b...

Use of a big data analysis technique for extracting HRA data from event investigation reports based on the Safety-II concept

“…With regard to this issue, unfortunately, there is no widely accepted solution at this time. However, there are two approaches we can follow in relation to this issue [Yoon et al, 2017]. Firstly, when we use system safety methods developed under Safety-I paradigm, we need to acknowledge their limitations and attempt to overcome them with the concepts and foundations of Safety-II.…”

“…Focusing on accident investigation methods developed under the paradigm of Safety-I, we can summarize the characteristics of Safey-I as follows [Yoon et al, 2017]:…”

“…Previously, we summarized the six characteristics of Safety-I, focusing on accident investigation methods. Here, based on the concepts and principles of Safety-II, we can also summarize the following six characteristics of Safety-II, which correspond, in order, to those of Safety-I [Yoon et al, 2017]: (1) an accident analysis method should admit that an accident cannot be sufficiently explained by linear, simple cause-effect relationships, (2) an accident needs to be investigated without too much relying on an accident causation model, (3) an accident is not so simple that it can be sufficiently explained only with a root-cause, (4) it should be acknowledged that the currently assumed set of causal factors may not be actual causes of the accident and that other contextual factors assumed not to be problematic may be actual causes, (5) the causes of successful outcomes and adverse outcomes are not different but the same, and (6) an accident analysis method should focus on the performance variability in terms of resource demands and resources available in the situation of an accident, instead of human errors [Hollnagel 2012;Hollnagel et al 2013;Leonhardt et al 2009;Shorrock et al 2014]. Considering the characteristics above, we can say that the purpose of prospective risk assessment in Safety-II is to understand the conditions where performance variability can become difficult or impossible to monitor and control [Hollnagel et al, 2013].…”

“…However, one should not think that traditional approaches are useless due to their drawbacks. In spite of those shortcomings, they are still useful in retrospective accident investigation and prospective risk assessment [Salmon et al, 2012;Shorrock, 2014;Yoon et al, 2017]. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that there is a growing number of accidents in modern complex socio-technical systems where Safety-I approach cannot be effectively used [Hollnagel 2014].…”

Cause Analysis of Unsafe Behaviors in Hazardous Chemical Accidents: Combined with HFACs and Bayesian Network

“…Kim et al [26] used HFACs to investigate the relationship between all of the hazards from the view of organizational factors in the field of nuclear industry. Yoona et al [27] proposed a new method for modeling and analyzing human-related accidents, which integrates HFACs and activity theory-based approach; the method was verified by a nuclear plant case. Theophilus et al [28] used HFACs to analyze the organizational factors and human errors in the oil and gas industry.…”