A national survey of state legislation defining mental retardation: implications for policy and practice afterAtkins

Abstract

In Atkins v. Virginia 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing offenders who are mentally retarded. Rather than adopting a uniform definition of mental retardation, the court charged each state with defining mental retardation in a manner that enforces the constitutional restriction. An unanswered question is how states define mental retardation after Atkins, which has implications for capital defendants and forensic evaluators who conduct capital mitigation evaluations. This project identified the statutory definitions of mental retardation in each state, and grouped the definitions based on consistency with accepted clinical criteria for mental retardation. Results show that definitions of mental retardation vary considerably by state. The large majority of states, both overall and specifically among death penalty states, use criteria for mental retardation that are not entirely consistent with accepted clinical standards. As such, it is not clear whether the majority of states are effectuating the intent of Atkins. The implications of these findings for both policy and practice are discussed.

A Value-Critical Policy Analysis of Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof of Intellectual Disability

“…As well, the Court cited the rationale that defendants with intellectual disability face an increased risk of wrongful execution because they “are less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel, typically make poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes” ( Atkins v Virginia , 2002; Cheung, 2013, p. 319). The U.S. Supreme Court also opined that persons with intellectual disability had significant impairments in their ability to (a) process information, (b) logically reason, (c) control their impulses, and (d) learn from experience (DeMatteo, Marczyk, & Pich, 2007). Not only did the Court express concern that individuals with intellectual disability are less morally culpable, but the high Court also expressed concern that individuals with intellectual disability face unique procedural challenges in the U.S. criminal justice system (DeMatteo et al, 2007).…”

The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia

“…Atkins ’ delegation of responsibility for implementing the mandate's details to the states, though not uncommon, has been characterized as especially problematic. Clear and uniform definitions of intellectual disability are, Atkins literature suggests, critical for implementing a constitutional bright line between life and death (Ellis 2003; Bonnie and Gustafson 2007; DeMatteo, Marczyk, and Pich 2007; Barger 2008; Blume, Johnson, and Seeds 2008b; Weithorn 2008; White 2009). In this definitional vacuum, the Court's citations to the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 4 ( DSM ) and the American Association of Mental Retardation 5 (AAIDD), which both define intellectual disability as characterized by (1) subaverage intellectual functioning with (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning that (3) manifest during childhood, have functioned as a de facto point of implementation reference.…”

“…A majority of states do define intellectual disability through some combination of these three prongs, but many fail to operationalize them with sufficient specificity (DeMatteo, Marczyk, and Pich 2007). 6 As a result, definitions appear to comport with prevailing scientific standards, but diagnosing intellectual disability is nuanced, and the vagueness that has characterized the legal operationalization of intellectual disability produces considerable variation in how Atkins is implemented across death penalty states (Duvall and Morris 2006; Blume, Johnson, and Seeds 2008b).…”

Mental Disorder and Criminal Law

“…As Professor Slobogin noted, clarification is necessary with respect to both the type of predicted harm and type of act warranting extreme punishment as opposed to alternatives to capital punishment. The dearth of efforts to define dangerousness is in contrast to the significant attention to definition of mental retardation post-Atkins (DeMatteo, Marczyk, & Pich, 2007). These definitions of mental retardation both overlap with and display significant variance from accepted clinical standards pertaining to such developmental disorders.…”