A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Allen, Keith

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.001.0001

Cited by 61 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Roughly, then, the experiential aspect of perceiving is supposed to be at least in part "inherited" from objects themselves. Or, more pithily, what the experience is like is a function of what the perceived object itself is like (Fish 2009;Allen 2016; but see Beck 2018). For instance, what explains the redness as a constituent in the phenomenal character of my experience of a red apple is the redness of the apple itself.…”

Section: The Two Core Claims Of Naïve Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Bower

2019

Grazer Philos. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.

show abstract

Section: The Two Core Claims Of Naïve Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Bower

2019

Grazer Philos. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Why should we believe that Depth is a core belief? The binary/unitary distinction, although orthodoxy today, was once (and still is to a degree, Mizrahi 2009; Jameson 2010) the subject of philosophical and scientific scrutiny (Allen 2011, 2016. Given that this investigation into the nature of the colors took place, those who took part probably thought that the colors were properties about which, intuitively, such an investigation could be fruitful.…”

Section: Propositional Revelation and Depthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Another look at color primitivism

Roberts

2018

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article is on a precise kind of color primitivism, 'ostensivism.' This is the view that it is in the nature of the colors that they are phenomenal, non-reductive, structural, categorical properties. First, I differentiate ostensivism from other precise forms of primitivism. Next, I examine the core belief 'Revelation,' and propose a revised version, which, unlike standard statements, is compatible with a yet unstated but plausible core belief: roughly, that there are interesting things to be discovered about the nature of the colors. Finally, I show that ostensivism is the only view on color that can accommodate both proposed core beliefs.

show abstract

“…An interesting issue, mentioned in passing by Matthen, is whether naïve realists who subscribe to a primitivist theory of color do hold something like the pre‐modern view. On Allen's (:4) account, naïve realists are committed to the thesis that colors are “distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences.” This of course raises the question of what kinds of properties the colors could then be – are they something like the pre‐modern sensible forms? I do not think that even the naïve realists are committed to such ontological excesses.…”

Section: Reply To Mohan Matthenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… This approach is by no means peculiar to me. It is central to the arguments against physicalism by Allen () and Pautz (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%