A multi-stakeholder potential game model in active distribution network considering the bounded rationality of small users

Abstract

The increase in the penetration rate of distributed renewable energy sources has brought unprecedented challenges to the economic and stable operation of the active distribution network (ADN). To improve the operating efficiency and total benefits of the ADN, it is necessary to establish an optimization model considering the stakeholders’ market behavior and the game relationship among them under the market environment. In this paper, a multi-stakeholder potential game model in the ADN considering the bounded rationality of small users is proposed. The game relationships among five stakeholders, including the distributed photovoltaic generation aggregators, the distributed wind power aggregators, the energy storage operators, the large users and the load aggregators, are modeled on an hourly time scale. Existing research has proved that the game equilibrium of the potential game model must exist. Based on the information transfer and the strategy update mode on the social network, a demand response evolutionary game model for small users is established. Moreover, a distributed algorithm is designed to obtain the pure strategy equilibrium. Finally, a case with five stakeholders and 160 small users is used to verify the rationality and feasibility of the proposed model.

Market equilibrium with strategic pricing and strategic constraints in renewable energy: the role of private energy storage

“…While existing literature has explored the strategic behavior of RE in the context of market equilibrium, it has primarily been confined to strategic pricing, often formulated within a bilevel modeling framework that includes an upper-level RE profit maximization model and a lowerlevel market clearing model (Ruiz et al, 2012;Kazempour and Zareipour, 2014;Hartwig and Kockar, 2016;Zou et al, 2016;Heredia et al, 2018;Wang et al, 2018;Guo et al, 2020;Huang et al, 2021;Dai et al, 2022;Naemi et al, 2022;Wang et al, 2022;Zhang et al, 2023a;Zhang et al, 2023b). Commonly, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (Kazempour et al, 2012;Zeynali et al, 2022) are employed to recast the bilevel problem into a single-level nonlinear framework, namely a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) (Guo et al, 2020).…”

“…By introducing dynamic game of strategic RE and ES (Wang et al, 2022), proposes a multi-stakeholder potential game model considering the bounded rationality. Reference (Hartwig and Kockar, 2016) evaluates the impact of strategic behavior of an independent trader who operates private ESs in a nodal electricity market.…”

“…While these studies (Ruiz et al, 2012;Kazempour and Zareipour, 2014;Hartwig and Kockar, 2016;Zou et al, 2016;Heredia et al, 2018;Wang et al, 2018;Guo et al, 2020;Huang et al, 2021;Dai et al, 2022;Naemi et al, 2022;Wang et al, 2022;Zhang et al, 2023a;Zhang et al, 2023b) advance the modeling of strategic pricing and market behaviors for the alliance of REs and ESs, they conventionally treat the variable power output constraints of RE resources as fixed parameters. This simplification overlooks the dynamic nature of RE outputs influenced by the integration of ES technologies.…”