A Moving Target Defense Control Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems

Kanellopoulos, Aris; Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos G.

doi:10.1109/tac.2019.2915746

Cited by 80 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The state of the (2, 2)-resilient system, modeled by Eqs. (13), (14) and (15), is recoverable in one step when, for Tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4, the inflows are greater than zero, but respectively less than η1λw1 α , η2λw2 α (1−η2)λw2 α and…”

Section: ) Attacks On Actuators and Sensorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To make it challenging, detection methods comprise the integration of time-varying elements (inputs or states) concealed in the dynamics of the plant. Assuming the parameters of these elements are changed fast enough, the dynamics of the plant becomes a moving target for the adversary [13], [14]. In other words, the adversary does not have enough time to learn properly, makes errors and perpetrates attacks that are not covert [8], [9].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Resilience Estimation of Cyber-Physical Systems via Quantitative Metrics

Barbeau

Cuppens

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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This paper is about the estimation of the cyber-resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). We define two new resilience estimation metrics: k-steerability and-monitorability. They aim at assisting designers to evaluate and increase the cyber-resilience of CPS when facing stealthy attacks. The k-steerability metric reflects the ability of a controller to act on individual plant state variables when, at least, k different groups of functionally diverse input signals may be processed. The-monitorability metric indicates the ability of a controller to monitor individual plant state variables with different groups of functionally diverse outputs. Paired together, the metrics lead to CPS reaching (k,)-resilience. When k and are both greater than one, a CPS can absorb and adapt to control-theoretic attacks manipulating input and output signals. We also relate the parameters k and to the recoverability of a system. We define recoverability strategies to mitigate the impact of perpetrated attacks. We show that the values of k and can be augmented by combining redundancy and diversity in hardware and software, in order to apply the moving target paradigm. We validate the approach via simulation and numeric results.

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Section: ) Attacks On Actuators and Sensorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resilience Estimation of Cyber-Physical Systems via Quantitative Metrics

Barbeau

Cuppens

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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“…Weerakkody et al [12] proposes a MTD approach to minimize identification in CPS, i.e., to limit the adversary's knowledge of the system model with the goal of identifying sensor attacks by changing the dynamics of the system as a function of time. Kanellopoulos et al [10] proposes an approach to mitigate sensor and actuator attacks by formulating a control algorithm based on MTD that provides a proactive and reactive defense mechanism. It uses a stochastic switching structure to alter the parameters of the system and make it more difficult for the adversary to perform a system reconnaissance.…”

Section: Iii1 Network Mtd Approaches -mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are two mechanisms to design equivalent control systems capable of controlling the same physical process. One possibility is to have redundant sensors and actuators, as proposed in [10]. This mechanism requires to add extra hardware to the system.…”

Section: Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As showed in recent surveys [7] [8] [9], most of the existing approaches require adding extra hardware [10], which may be expensive. Other solutions use detection approaches with recovery strategies [11] [12] [13] [14] that usually use state estimation to maintain an understanding of the system state under attack, even when a subset of inputs and outputs are compromised.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Switched-Based Resilient Control of Cyber-Physical Systems

Segovia-Ferreira¹,

Rubio‐Hernan²,

Cavalli³

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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We present a control-theoretic approach to achieve Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) resilient designs. We assume situations in which the CPS must maintain the correct operation of a set of crucial functionalities despite ongoing adversarial misbehavior. The approach is based on a moving target defense paradigm, driven by a linear switching of state-space matrices, and applied at both the physical and network layers of a networked-control system. We show that the final system maintains stability. We also evaluate, via simulation, a step-by-step procedure that takes a transfer function, representing the dynamics of the physical process. As a result, we obtain a resilient CPS design structured around a topology of decentralized controllers. Results show that the obtained approach is both innovative and promising.

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Stealthy multiplicative attacks against cyber‐physical systems: A gap metric approach

Zhao

et al. 2022

Intl J Robust & Nonlinear

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In this article, a stealthy multiplicative attack design scheme for cyber‐physical systems equipped with parity space based detector is proposed, with the aid of gap metric method. First, a novel stealthiness index defined by the gap metric is presented for multiplicative attacks, and the security analysis issue of parity space based detector is formulated. Then, the attack subspace satisfying the stealthiness constraint is constructed, and the subspace rotation is applied to parameterize the multiplicative attacks. Moreover, a joint optimization method is presented to design the stealthy multiplicative attacks. Finally, simulations on a flight vehicle demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

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A Moving Target Defense Control Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cited by 80 publications

References 32 publications

Resilience Estimation of Cyber-Physical Systems via Quantitative Metrics

Resilience Estimation of Cyber-Physical Systems via Quantitative Metrics

Switched-Based Resilient Control of Cyber-Physical Systems

Stealthy multiplicative attacks against cyber‐physical systems: A gap metric approach

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