Whether referenda should be adopted to decide questions about national-identity/boundary issues has been debated for the last two centuries. The German lawyers Hotzendorf, Geffker, Stoerk, and Francis Liever, for example, denied use of referenda on the grounds that they subjected the minority to the rule of a simple majority without protection; that they contradicted the organic nature of the state; that they would encourage secession and make the estab lishment of peace more difficult; and that they were used to ratify faits accomplis. 1 Likewise, British ministers and their constitutional advisers were reluctant to use referenda to smooth their own path toward decolonization because (1) referenda would undermine represen tative parliamentary systems; (2) there was a perceived lack of "readiness" among the people concerned; and (3) there were the difficulties of providing fair protection for various ethnic groups living in the same country. The British institutional arrangements were limited franchises and balanced constituencies. 2 Kedourie further points out the difference between elections of leadership and plebiscites (or referenda) over national-boundary questions. Plebiscites and referenda express a decision made once and for all, yet their results are no less conclusive or arbitrary than those of any other methods. For Kedourie, Plebiscites are not more certain, more equitable, or less liable to criticism than the traditional methods by which boundaries are