A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation

Endogenous alliances in survival contests

“…They find that the weaker player may get a higher payoff under effort complementarity. Crutzen and Sahuguet (2018) and Crutzen et al (2020) compare political party competition with multiple party candidates under different voting systems using CES aggregator functions.…”

“…To apply a method called the "share function" approach that is systematically analyzed in Cornes and Hartley (2005), we rewrite the second-stage competition as a Tullock contest with heterogeneous marginal costs. 12 Formally, let w j = n 2−3σ 1−σ j (marginal cost) and x j = n 1 1−σ j e j (effort) for each j = 1, ..., J. An artificial Tullock contest game (J, (w j ) J j=1 ) corresponding to our second-stage game is a J-person game in which each player j exerts effort x j with constant marginal cost w j > 0.…”

Moral Hazard in Electoral Teams

“…The seats won by any particular list will depend, at least in part, on the campaigning eorts of all its candidates. Yet, if they care only about winning seats for themselves, then candidates listed in either safe or hopeless spots will have little incentive to exert eortas recognized by, for example, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003), André, Depauw and Martin (2015), and Crutzen, Flamand and Sahuguet (2020).…”

“…Crutzen, Flamand and Sahuguet (2020) consider an egalitarian rule (under which every candidate has an equal chance of winning one of the list's seats), analyzing when such a rule improves the overall performance of the list relative to the usual rule of allocating seats in order of appearance on the list.4 Closed lists allow voters to vote for parties as a whole but not to aect the party-supplied order in which candidates on the list are elected. Open lists allow voters to vote directly for candidates.…”

Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests

“…1 r , where r ∈ (0, 1] indicates the degree of the effort complementarity. 5 This CES aggregator function becomes a linear function (perfect substitutes-no complementarity) when r = 1 and a Cobb-Douglas function when r = 0 in the limit (each member's effort is essential in the sense that if a member makes no effort then the aggregate 5 Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) are the first in the literature to introduce group members' effort complementarity in group contests by using a CES production function. They call this CES function a group impact function.…”