A model based on the evolutionary game theory for implementing green mining principles in riverine sand and gravel resources

Mahdevari, Satar; Fazli Allah Abadi, Amir

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139501

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Li et al [6] employed evolutionary game theory to investigate the potential paradigm shift in the taxi market, emphasizing the critical role of factors such as the ratio of driverless to traditional cab fares, driverless cab technology, and the scale of driverless cab operations. Mahdevari et al [7] delved into strategies for sustainable mining in river gravel mines, revealing that mine managers tend to adopt green mining strategies in response to evolving governmental supervision. An et al [8] constructed an evolutionary game model using financial and macro data from the United States, demonstrating a dynamic process of mutually reinforcing development between financial innovation and regulation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Novel Strategy to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trade Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory

Qi,

Shen,

et al. 2024

Preprint

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The illicit trade in wildlife can precipitate a decline in border stability, the spread of diseases, and environmental degradation, thus impacting the gover-nance of governments. Consequently, governments are committed to combating the illegal wildlife trade. This paper investigates the impact of illegal wildlife trade on governance, proposing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving poachers, buyers, and governments. It analyzes strategic choices and benefits, suggesting dynamic enforcement adjustments guided by data prediction. Therefore , we conlude that: (1) A sustained high enforcement intensity coefficient leads to diminishing marginal benefits. (2) There is an inverse relationship between the enforcement intensity coefficient and the probability of buyers purchasing illegal wildlife and related products. (3) The trend in the probability of governments opting to combat the illegal wildlife trade mirrors that of enforcement efficiency. (4) The impact of reputational gains on combating illegal wildlife trade is minimal. (5) The higher the cost of combating the illegal wildlife trade, the better the effectiveness of the efforts, showing results in the short term once a certain threshold is reached; when the cost is lower, it may lead to a short-term rebound in the volume of illegal wildlife trade, but a long-term decreasing trend is still observed.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%