A micro-political perspective on subsidiary initiative-taking: Evidence from German-owned subsidiaries in France

Miners, politics and institutional caryatids: Accounting for the transfer of HRM practices in the Brazilian multinational enterprise

“…The presence of strong NBS centralizing influences persists, for example, with corporate boards remaining largely the preserve 10 of home-country nationals, and with key decisions in respect of capital allocation, control mechanisms and the remuneration and career advancement of subsidiary managerial personnel being overseen by corporate management (Dörrenbächer, 2000;Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009;Egelhoff, 2010;Ferner et al, 2012;Harzing & Sorge, 2003). However, in matters relating to IR and HRM, such as wage determination, performance management and employee participation, MNEs have been found to be more susceptible to the imprint of a host-country's institutional framework.…”

O Que Gestão Estratégica Tem a Ver com Capitalismo(s)?

“…Por sua vez, as instituições complementares -i.e., aquelas que modelam as regras seguidas por organizações e grandes corporações -são descritas como reprodutoras e reforçadoras das bases nacionais (Morgan, 2007 Compreender como grandes corporações respondem estrategicamente a essa representação de diversidade e complexidade institucional passou a ser um dos focos da literatura na Europa em meados dos anos 2000 (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006). Com base na ideia de que grandes corporações são uma instituição universal, a maior parte das pesquisas vem se restringindo a análises comparadas dentro da Europa (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009), e não problematizando o papel central das corporações no fomento de reformas institucionais no resto do mundo. Mais recentemente, pesquisadores europeus passaram a analisar tais fenômenos na Ásia, sob a perspectiva ocidentalista inaugurada pelo capitalismo histórico (Gamble, 2010).…”

The Multinational as a Corporate Form: A Critical Contribution from Organization Studies

“…In this perspective, local spill-overs and learning effects are predominantly dictated by head office requirements, a situation which leaves local actors relatively powerless. In other contexts, however, the dominant managerial group in the subsidiary may be locals who perceive a community of fate with other employees in the firm and are therefore willing and able to strategize for the development of the subsidiary, either within or exceptionally outside the current MNC (as discussed in Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005) However, the literature from organization studies suggests that this perspective has to be balanced by a focus on other social actors within the local context (Bélanger et al, 1999;Morgan et al, 2001;Morgan and Kristensen, 2006;Kristensen and Morgan, 2007;Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009;Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer, 2011;Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011;Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011). Considering, firstly, the actors internal to the subsidiary -what strengths and capabilities might they have which could counteract or develop alternatives to the strategies which the MNC HQ seeks to impose?…”