A Methodology for the Evaluation of Competition Policy

Hüschelrath, Kai; Leheyda, Nina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1727352

SSRN Journal

2010

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1727352

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A Methodology for the Evaluation of Competition Policy

Kai Hüschelrath

Nina Leheyda

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2023

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“…Hüschelrath and Leheyda (2010) developed a three-step and nine-building-blocks methodology to provide guidance for designing, implementing and reporting projects that evaluate competition policy. More recently, also proposed an analytical framework for assessing the impact of antitrust agencies' decisions.3 For example,Rodriguez and DeNardis (2007) conducted a cross-country study of 102 nations that evaluated the performance of competition policy enforcement and reported a high level of variance among countries.…”

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The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition: Evidence from the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

Pelaez,

Gutiérrez

2023

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This paper investigates how fines on hard-core cartels affect market competition in Colombia. We use data from the national department of statistics and the competition agency, which covers 10,316 firms in the manufacturing sector from 2012 to 2020 and a panel of 67,671 observations. We measure market competition by the complement of the Lerner index and an indicator variable to account for the variation in the timing and sectors of the fines. We apply a difference-in-differences (DID) approach with multiple periods based on Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) and perform robustness tests with Gardner (2021) and by incorporating anticipation effects. Our results show that the fines had a positive and gradual impact on market competition, implying that they deterred cartel behavior but also that some tacit collusion and price inertia persisted over time. JEL codes: K21 - Antitrust Law, L41 - Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices, L60 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing, C23 - Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models, D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis

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The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition: Evidence from the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

Pelaez,

Gutiérrez

2023

Preprint

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A Methodology for the Evaluation of Competition Policy

Cited by 1 publication

References 10 publications

The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition: Evidence from the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition: Evidence from the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

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