A non-Fregean framework aims to provide a formal tool for reasoning about semantic denotations of sentences and their interactions. Extending a logic to its non-Fregean version involves introducing a new connective $$\equiv $$
≡
that allows to separate denotations of sentences from their logical values. Intuitively, $$\equiv $$
≡
combines two sentences $$\varphi $$
φ
and $$\psi $$
ψ
into a true one whenever $$\varphi $$
φ
and $$\psi $$
ψ
have the same semantic correlates, describe the same situations, or have the same content or meaning. The paper aims to compare non-Fregean paraconsistent Grzegorczyk’s logics (Logic of Descriptions $$\textsf{LD}$$
LD
, Logic of Descriptions with Suszko’s Axioms $$\textsf{LDS}$$
LDS
, Logic of Equimeaning $$\textsf{LDE}$$
LDE
) with non-Fregean versions of certain well-known paraconsistent logics (Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic $$\textsf{D}_2$$
D
2
, Logic of Paradox $$\textsf{LP}$$
LP
, Logics of Formal Inconsistency $$\textsf{LFI}{1}$$
LFI
1
and $$\textsf{LFI}{2}$$
LFI
2
). We prove that Grzegorczyk’s logics are either weaker than or incomparable to non-Fregean extensions of $$\textsf{LP}$$
LP
, $$\textsf{LFI}{1}$$
LFI
1
, $$\textsf{LFI}{2}$$
LFI
2
. Furthermore, we show that non-Fregean extensions of $$\textsf{LP}$$
LP
, $$\textsf{LFI}{1}$$
LFI
1
, $$\textsf{LFI}{2}$$
LFI
2
, and $$\textsf{D}_2$$
D
2
are more expressive than their original counterparts. Our results highlight that the non-Fregean connective $$\equiv $$
≡
can serve as a tool for expressing various properties of the ontology underlying the logics under consideration.