A method for determining the spent-fuel contribution to transport cask containment requirements

Data and methods for the assessment of the risks associated with the maritime transport of radioactive materials: Results of the SeaRAM program studies. Volume 1 -- Main report

“…The largest average accelerations calculated for any set of input parameter values were always less than 1 m/s2 for the no and light cargo cases, and less than 2 d s ' for the medium and heavy cargo cases. Because these accelerations are only a small fraction (about 1 percent) of the accelerations treated by Sanders et al [22], the impact forces generated by ship collisions are not expected to damage the contents of any RAM transport casks carried on the struck ship.…”

“…Such severe impacts do not normally occur during spent fuel handling and transport. It was shown in Sanders et al [22], however, that under accident conditions corresponding to a nine-meter drop onto an unyielding target, one of the regulatory tests, there is a small but significant probability (up to rod flexure or the collapse of fuel assembly spacer grids, that the applied loads would result in crack extension completely through the cladding wall. This would result in a pinhole crack or slit with subsequent rod depressurization and the release of radioactive gases and aerosols to the interior of the cask.…”

Evaluation of consequences of the potential accidents in the Norwegian coastal waters

“…The energy content is negligible as the accident scenario in question is taking place under water and there is free exchange of water between the spent fuel and sea. The inventory has been developed using the HELIOS programme in the case of submarine and the ORIGEN [5] programme in the case of ship transport on the basis of core data given below. The release as a function of time has been established on the basis of the worst-case assessment, taking the fuel, reactor and other containment properties into account as discussed below.…”

“…The total available release inventory of radioactivity for a standard fuel assembly, at the time of the ship sinking, was assumed to be 30,1 PBq [5]. Two scenarios with transport of 10 and 100 assemblies were considered.…”

The Evauation Approch of Spent Nuclear Fuel Intergrity by Using Finite Eleement Method

“…The US Department of Energy's research institutes assessed their integrity in consideration of the characteristics of the SNF and selected representative SNF to carry out integrity analysis together with the transport container. The one research regarding rail way transportation of SNF conducted by US nuclear fuel companies and research institutes [7,8].…”