A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity

Sandgren, Alexander

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1609-3

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…My (Sandgren 2019a; recent work on intentionality provides us with a foundation for building a listless account of aboutness with an eye on the intentional problem of the many.…”

Section: The Co-aboutness First Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thought and Talk in a Generous World

Sandgren

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The problem of the many seems to problematize the platitude that we can think about particular things in the world. How is it that, given how very many cat-like candidates there are, we often manage to think and talk about a particular cat? I argue that this challenge stems from an under-examined assumption about the relationship between metaphysics and intentionality. I explore and develop a way of characterizing what it is to think and talk about the world, according to which an abundant ontology poses no obstacle to our ability to think and talk about particular things.

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“…My (Sandgren 2019a; recent work on intentionality provides us with a foundation for building a listless account of aboutness with an eye on the intentional problem of the many.…”

Section: The Co-aboutness First Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thought and Talk in a Generous World

Sandgren

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Dennett (1968), Donnellan (1974), andGeach (1976) make early attempts at archer first explanations of co-aboutness. More recently, Perry (2001), Sainsbury (2010), Crane (2013, p. 165), Friend (2014, Pagin (2014), Sandgren (2019a), and Garcia-Carpintero ( 2020) have all defended archer first theories of co-aboutness. These views differ in detail, but they all attempt to explain co-aboutness without appealing to intentional objects (exotic or not).…”

Section: Co-aboutness Againmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The co-aboutness first approach does not stand or fall with the simple causal account of co-aboutness. There are a number of not-purely-causal archer-first accounts of co-aboutness to choose from, for example, Crane (2013, p. 165), Pagin (2014), Friend (2014, Sandgren (2019a), andGarcia-Carpintero (2020).…”

Section: Choosing a Theory Of Co-aboutnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Turning Aboutness About

Sandgren

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

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“…Unfortunately, there exist convincing examples showing that a causal link is not, in general, necessary for intentional identity attributions to be appropriate (cf. Edelberg, 1992;van Rooy, 2000;Sandgren, 2016).…”

Section: The Problem Of Intentional Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%