A matter of preference: Taking sides on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project

Abstract

Over the past few years, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has been one of the most divisive issues in EU politics, with some member states opposing the project, others supporting it, and a third group adopting a neutral stance. Which conditions explain these varying national positions? Our study offers the first systematic attempt to examine preference formation with regard to Nord Stream 2 across the entire EU membership. Drawing on elite surveys, we compile an original dataset to position EU member states in the Nord Stream 2 debate. We then perform a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to uncover the determinants of the differing positions taken by member states. The Nord Stream 2 controversy is employed as a testing ground for new intergovernmentalist theory, which argues that preference formation is not just shaped by material and (geo)political conditions, but also by the preferences of other member states. Our study finds that material benefits and the role of Russia are relevant conditions for position formation on Nord Stream 2. However, in this case, we did not find evidence for the importance of other member states' preferences.

Network Disruptions and the Security of Supply in the European Gas Network

“…These results are generally in line with the division between supporters and opponents of the project (see, for instance, de Jong et al, 2020). Note that Germany and Austria face increased risks as well, their supportive stance can be explained by their special roles as distributing hubs for Eastern Europe under these scenarios.…”

Under pressure: A qualitative comparative analysis on the factors contributing to the success and failure of cross-border gas pipeline construction in Europe and Turkey

“…[13] indicates the use of a government-to-government mechanism in the energy sector to promote projects. This is also found in the Nord Stream 2 project as economic and supply benefits attributed to political support from Germany and Austria, tied to economic and supply benefits [14], and the Green Stream pipeline that benefited from close diplomatic relations between Libya and Italy [15]. This support extends to transit countries, as found by [16].…”

“…Second, we will examine whether support of powerful states, such as Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey, have a positive impact on pipeline completion. 3 Specifically, the economic and supply benefits for powerful states are analyzed, as they seem to play an important role [9,[14][15][16]19,21]. A physical (a more direct supply benefit) or an economic (company headquartered in powerful state) connection to one of these powerful states results in a "1" score.…”

Tracing the downfall of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline

“…There was also apprehension about how this would impact gas corridor development in the EU. Moreover, the pipeline divided EU member states, with some seeing Russian gas as a commercial project and others seeing major security concerns (de Jong et al, 2022; Lang & Westphal, 2017).…”

“…In other studies, the project is mostly used as an illustrative example. In particular, the project has been used to highlight the struggle between the European Commission and member states, and to advance integration in the EU energy domain, especially in relation to the amended Gas Directive (see, e.g., de Jong et al, 2022; de Jong & Van de Graaf, 2021). Also, the debate on the external power of the Commission is assisted by the case of Nord Stream 2, as a more geopolitical Commission is revealed (Batzella, 2022; Gens, 2019; Goldthau & Sitter, 2020; Schmidt, 2020).…”