2011
DOI: 10.1177/223386591101400201
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A Matrix for Post-Soviet ‘Color Revolutions’: Exorcising the Devil from the Details

Abstract: The spectacular and unexpected explosion of revolutionary energy in the Arab world since the start of 2011 makes it more relevant to re-examine the chain of attempts to depose the quasi-democratic regimes in the states that emerged from the break-up of the USSR. Often called “color revolutions”, these attempts brought some remarkable results in the mid-2000s, but—against common perceptions—continue. The analysis shows that the rate of success in the collection of 13 cases is close to 50%, but the track record … Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Kyrgyzstanis did not need their everyday hardships to be translated by elites to know they existed; instead, opposition politicians smartly reacted to those concerns. There was no opposition politician powerful enough to mobilize people and Bakiev's regime had become repressive enough to silence public dissent; Baisalov was in exile, Kulov withdrew from politics and was working on hydroelectricity issues, Atambayev roundly lost the July 2009 presidential election which was not a triggering event as is often the case (Baev 2011;Beissinger 2007;Kulov 2008;Kuntz and Thompson 2009). Savvy opposition leaders went to places like Naryn where public attitudes were 'heating up' after tariff increases (Ferghana.ru 2010).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kyrgyzstanis did not need their everyday hardships to be translated by elites to know they existed; instead, opposition politicians smartly reacted to those concerns. There was no opposition politician powerful enough to mobilize people and Bakiev's regime had become repressive enough to silence public dissent; Baisalov was in exile, Kulov withdrew from politics and was working on hydroelectricity issues, Atambayev roundly lost the July 2009 presidential election which was not a triggering event as is often the case (Baev 2011;Beissinger 2007;Kulov 2008;Kuntz and Thompson 2009). Savvy opposition leaders went to places like Naryn where public attitudes were 'heating up' after tariff increases (Ferghana.ru 2010).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is indicated by the fact that most of these accounts hardly ever provide a definition of what is meant by a revolution, or perceive of the term as more or less an equivalent of popular contentious activism in the perspective of social movement theory, or unrest more broadly (Paige, 1975). Moreover, in the established literature on revolutions, scholars tend to remain unsatisfied with the mere observation of popular mass contention and are therefore concerned with the, often long-term and substantive, outcome of such contentious episodes (Baev, 2011). Yet again, no scholarly agreement exists on what type of trajectory defines an event as revolutionary.…”
Section: Theorizing Revolutionary Changementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The revolutionary events in Serbia in 2000 are often projected as trend-setting for the 'Colour Revolutions' in some post-Soviet states in the mid-2000s with elections acting as the trigger for mass protests (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006;Baev, 2011). The name comes from the fact that most of these civic protests used a specific colour or flower in their symbolic interpretative frames.…”
Section: The Colour Revolutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%