A mathematical model of cooperative advertising support to the followers in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain

Ezimadu, Peter E.

doi:10.1504/ijor.2022.123450

Cited by 6 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…A model considering both players' engagement in promotion can be used to extend the work. Further, an extension and modification can examine a three-level channel situation in which the channel leader and the first follower provides credit to the retailer as was consider in [30,31].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Mathematical Model of Optimal Manufacturer-Retailer Trade Credit Policy with End-User Credit Support

Ezimadu

2023

ARJOM

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The formulation and incorporation of credit function into trade credit models is a much recent development. In addition extension of this innovation to the end-user has not been achieved. This work models trade credit interaction extension from a manufacturer to a consumer through the retailer. It considers a Stackelberg game-theoretic model setting in which the manufacturer provides channel trade credit through the retailer to the end-user, while the retailer engages in promotion of the product. The paper uses backward induction to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium for the promotion effort, the retailer’s credit period and the manufacturer’s credit period. It also obtains the long-run Stackelberg equilibria for the decision variables. The paper shows that the retailer is more liberal with allowable credit period than the manufacturer. In general, the players are credit period-liberal with retail margin, and ungenerous with credit period with manufacturer’s margin. It further shows that the manufacturer’s credit period increases more rapidly than the retailer’s credit period with retailer’s margin. On the other hand the manufacturer’s credit period decreases more rapidly than the retailer’s credit period with the manufacturer’s margin.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Mathematical Model of Optimal Manufacturer-Retailer Trade Credit Policy with End-User Credit Support

Ezimadu

2023

ARJOM

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“…Game-theoretic models are very useful tools in supply chain studies and analyses [13][14][15]. There are relatively very few game-theoretic trade credit models.…”

Section: Original Research Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The supplier incorporates the retailer's anticipated response to We will consider two scenarios: a situation where the supplier provides credit support to the retailer, and a situation where he does not. We note that a similar approach was adopted by [27] which is the first to consider a Stackelberg cooperative advertising model with two followers using differential game. Another such approach was adopted by [28] where four channel structures were considered.…”

Section: The Game Decision Trendmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Game-Theoretic Credit Period and Promotion Model in a Supplier-Retailer Channel

Ezimadu

2022

ARJOM

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It has been established that trade credit can be influenced by a lot of factors. However, no specific function has been used to neither represent these factors nor consider their effects. This paper considers a supplier-retailer Stackelberg game in which the supplier as the channel leader supplies credit goods to the retailer who in-turn sells to the consumers. It uses a credit function based on credit period, supplier’s price margin and product promotion effort to model the players’ payoffs. The work considers two game scenarios: a situation involving the provision of trade credit and a situation without trade credit. The work obtains a closed-form solution for the credit period for the credit provision scenario, and the promotion efforts and payoffs for both scenarios, and shows that credit period prolongation may not be in favour of the retailer, and that the retailer can attain a larger payoff than the supplier. It also shows that the retailer’s margin is very crucial for both channel scenarios, and observes that the players are better-off with trade credit.

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“…Ranjan and Jha [28] investigated the pricing strategies and coordination mechanism between the members in a dual-channel supply chain. Ezimadu [29] used Stackelberg differential game theory to model the direct involvement of both the distributor and the retailer in advertising.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Joint Decision-Making of Timely Delivery, Product Quality and Marketing in Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

Hong-fang

Lin

Zhou³

et al. 2022

Sustainability

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Due to the sudden surge of orders, it is difficult for suppliers with a limited capacity to ensure that all orders are delivered in time and all the products are qualified. Suppliers are likely to put more limited capacity into completing orders, thus ignoring the quality of products. This will easily lead to the occurrence of product quality events, and then affect the goodwill of enterprise products. The innovations of this paper are as follows: first, based on the above facts, a negative and dynamic correlation between the delivery level and the quality level is established, which has been involved in previous studies. Second, the joint decision model of timely delivery, product quality, and marketing is constructed. Thirdly, centralized decision-making is the best way of supply chain cooperation, and cost sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain. This paper provides guidance for enterprise managers when making decisions on quality, marketing and delivery. It also provides the basis for enterprise managers to formulate effective cooperation models. We can draw some research implications: when consumers are less sensitive to timely delivery, enterprises should give some coupons and small gifts to consumers in exchange for the extension of delivery time and put their limited capacity into improving the product quality. When consumers are highly sensitive to timely delivery, they can outsource some orders to cost-effective and professional third-party enterprises, which not only improves the delivery rate but also improves the product quality.

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A mathematical model of cooperative advertising support to the followers in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

A Mathematical Model of Optimal Manufacturer-Retailer Trade Credit Policy with End-User Credit Support

A Mathematical Model of Optimal Manufacturer-Retailer Trade Credit Policy with End-User Credit Support

A Game-Theoretic Credit Period and Promotion Model in a Supplier-Retailer Channel

Research on Joint Decision-Making of Timely Delivery, Product Quality and Marketing in Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

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