2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.12.003
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A “Managerial” trade union and economic growth

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Cited by 29 publications
(78 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
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“…This result is similar to Chang et al (2007), who consider an AK growth model. Our study di¤ers from Chang et al (2007) by considering an R&D-based growth model.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 76%
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“…This result is similar to Chang et al (2007), who consider an AK growth model. Our study di¤ers from Chang et al (2007) by considering an R&D-based growth model.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 76%
“…This result is similar to Chang et al (2007), who consider an AK growth model. Our study di¤ers from Chang et al (2007) by considering an R&D-based growth model. More importantly, the current study di¤ers from all the above studies by exploring how union a¤ects the wealth-income ratio, in addition to employment and growth which have general-equilibrium e¤ects on the wealth-income ratio.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 76%
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“…The economy is populated by decentralized trade unions, so that each intermediate goodsproducing …rm negotiates with a single union i 2 (0; 1) which is too small to in ‡uence the outcome of the market. 11 Unions negotiate the wage on behalf of their members. Once unions are introduced in the analysis, two important issues arise: what is the objective function of the union and what are the variables of the bargaining process.…”
Section: Unions'wage Settingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unions, in this model, do not simply maximize the utility of their members, but are institutions that also have "political" objectives in the sense that their objective function takes into account the preferences of workers, the preferences of leaders and market constraints. In this respect we take side on the old and never settled debate initiated by Dunlop [18] and Ross [44] over the appropriate maximand for the unions'utility function, and we assume that the unions'objective function is a Stone-Geary utility function as in Dertouzos and Pencavel [16], Pencavel [38] and, more recently, by De la Croix et al [15], Raurich and Sorolla [41] and by Chang et al [11]. This function is extremely ‡exible and, depending on parameter values, allows for di¤erent distribution of power, inside the union, between members and leaders who may have diverging objectives.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%