2014
DOI: 10.1007/s13389-014-0089-3
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A machine learning approach against a masked AES

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Cited by 109 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…In another research direction, SVM was recently used as a tool to exploit device security. The results in [129,130] showed that ML methods can break cryptographic devices and that SVM is more effective in breaking cryptographic devices than the traditional method (i.e. template attack).…”
Section: ) Support Vector Machines (Svms)mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In another research direction, SVM was recently used as a tool to exploit device security. The results in [129,130] showed that ML methods can break cryptographic devices and that SVM is more effective in breaking cryptographic devices than the traditional method (i.e. template attack).…”
Section: ) Support Vector Machines (Svms)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent advances in ML and DL algorithms have enabled them to be used in breaking cryptographic implementations. For example, two previous studies [129,130] used ML to break cryptographic systems using SVMs, which outperformed the template attack. Similarly, the authors in [189] investigated different DL algorithms to break cryptographic systems and reported that DL can break cryptographic systems.…”
Section: ML and Dl Challenges 1) Possible Misuse Of Ml And Dl Algomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, SCA using machine learning techniques, such as k ‐means clustering, support vector machine, and random forest, also requires pre‐processing and POI selection. As pre‐processing and POI selection require human engineering, they significantly impact the results .…”
Section: Deep Learning‐based Side‐channel Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But these ML-based approaches mentioned above rely on the assumption that the leakage profile from the profiling and the target devices are similar. (21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)), running an AES encryption operation for a fixed plaintext and a fixed subkey 0x00 for first keybyte. Amplitudes are reported in Arbitrary Unit (A.U.…”
Section: Introduction a Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%